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I. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
A. SAFETY-RELATED CLAIMS
1. Register v. United Airlines, Inc.
IN REGISTER V. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., a passenger suedUnited Airlines after becoming involved in a verbal alterca-
tion with a flight attendant prior to takeoff.1 Plaintiff alleged
that another crewmember complained to the captain, who an-
nounced that the flight would return to the gate due to a “situa-
tion” on the aircraft.2 Plaintiff subsequently filed a number of
state and federal claims alleging, among other things, that
United had discriminated against him on account of his race.3
United moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted by the Federal Avia-
tion Act (the Act).4
The court agreed that the Act preempts state law claims when
an air carrier removes a passenger for safety reasons.5 Plaintiff
argued that safety was not implicated because the captain used
the word “situation” during his announcement rather than “se-
curity threat” or other similar language.6 Calling plaintiff’s argu-
1 Register v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 16-CV-2480 W (BGS), 2017 WL 784288,




5 Id. at *2 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b)).
6 Id. at *3.
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ment a “distinction without a difference,” the court held that it
was not plausible to conclude that the captain did not consider
the safety of passengers when he decided to return to the gate.7
Plaintiff’s state law claims were therefore preempted by the Act.8
B. EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING
1. Okeke-Henry v. Southwest Airlines, Co.
In Okeke-Henry v. Southwest Airlines Co., plaintiff sued after be-
ing struck in the head by another passenger’s bag.9 Plaintiff al-
leged that Southwest failed to: (1) properly oversee the
boarding process; (2) properly train its crewmembers to protect
passenger safety; (3) supervise its employees during boarding;
and (4) ensure that passengers would be uninjured during
boarding.10 On appeal, the court considered—as a matter of
first impression—whether the Act preempts claims for negli-
gence arising out of the boarding of an aircraft.11
The court found the Third Circuit’s opinion in Elassaad v. In-
dependence Air, Inc. instructive, where a passenger suffered inju-
ries while disembarking the aircraft.12 The Elassaad court
concluded that the Act does not preempt state tort law where
the claim relates to a crewmember’s oversight of the disembar-
kation process after the aircraft comes to a complete stop.13 The
Okeke-Henry court found the Elassaad holding persuasive, noting
the aircraft in the instant case had not moved from the gate
when the incident occurred nor had either passenger requested
the assistance of a flight attendant.14 As such, there was “no basis
for concluding that the incident occurred in the course of the
operation of the aircraft[,]” and the matter was remanded to the
trial court for additional proceedings.15
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Okeke-Henry v. Sw. Airlines Co., 163 A.3d 1014, 1015 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 1017.




15 Id. at 1018–19.
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C. FIELD PREEMPTION
1. Estate of Becker v. Avco Corp.
In Estate of Becker v. Avco Corp., the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton examined whether regulations created under the Act were
“so pervasive as to constitute field preemption of state product
liability law[.]”16 The case arose out of a plane crash that killed a
retired physician.17 The physician’s estate asserted a number of
tort claims, alleging that a poorly made carburetor caused the
aircraft’s engine to stall.18 One of the defendants, Forward Tech-
nology Industries, Inc. (FTI), filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, arguing that because of ubiquitous FAA regulations,
federal law occupied the entire field of aviation safety and plain-
tiff’s tort claims were thus preempted.19 The trial and appellate
courts sided with FTI.20
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower courts,
holding that the Act does not completely preempt state law.21
The court first looked to the Third Circuit’s decision in Sikkelee
v. Precision Airmotive Corp., which held that the Act was not so
pervasive as to preempt state products liability law.22 The Sikkelee
court found that although the Act does preempt the field of avi-
ation safety, neither the Act nor the regulations created by it
“were [ever] intended to create federal standards of care for
manufacturing and design defect claims.”23 Here, the court
agreed with the rationale in Sikkelee, finding that even though
there were minimum safety standards promulgated under the
Act, federal regulations did not attempt to regulate the actual
manufacture and design of aircraft.24 Federal regulations were
merely “baseline requirements” for aircraft manufacturers, not
limits to state court remedies.25
The court also found that Congress did not intend to com-
pletely preempt state law because it had twice declined to do
16 Estate of Becker v. Avco Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 2017).
17 Id. at 1067.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1068.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1069.
22 Id. at 1070 (citing Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680 (3d
Cir. 2016)).
23 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1070–71.
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so.26 Congress first rejected a 1989 bill that would have expressly
preempted all state tort liability laws for aviation accidents.27
Congress again revisited the issue when it passed the General
Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA).28 In that instance,
Congress created a statute of repose that limited a manufac-
turer’s liability, but the House Judiciary Committee specified
that it was “a very limited Federal preemption of State law.”29
Given the lack of “pervasive and comprehensive” regula-
tions—and the “strong general presumption against finding that
federal law has preempted state law”—the court concluded that
Washington’s product liability law was not preempted by the
Act.30
II. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
A. SNIDER V. STERLING AIRWAYS, INC.
In Snider v. Sterling Airways, Inc., plaintiffs sued Continental
Motors and others after plaintiffs’ decedents were killed in the
crash of a Cessna T210L following engine failure.31 The jury re-
turned a verdict against Continental (the engine manufacturer),
and Continental moved for entry of judgment as a matter of
law.32 Continental argued that plaintiffs’ claims were time-
barred by GARA because Continental had manufactured the en-
gine over eighteen years before the accident and no reasonable
juror could conclude otherwise.33
Under GARA’s statute of repose, claimants are barred from
bringing suit for death, injury, or property damage involving a
general aviation aircraft more than eighteen years after manu-
facture and delivery.34 A new limitation period begins when a
component is replaced, but a new period does not necessarily
begin for an entire system simply because one component part
was replaced.35
26 Id. at 1071.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
30 Id. at 1069, 1071.
31 Snider v. Sterling Airways, Inc., No. 13-CV-2949, 2017 WL 2813223, at *1
(E.D. Pa. June 29, 2017).
32 Id.
33 Id. at *2.
34 Id. at *3.
35 Id.
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Here, the court found that plaintiffs produced sufficient evi-
dence that Continental had manufactured a replacement part
for the engine just six years before the crash, which was installed
on the accident engine during an overhaul.36 The court noted
that all six cylinder assemblies were replaced with new cylinder
assemblies manufactured by Continental, and the failure of one
of the replacement cylinders caused the engine failure.37 As
such, the court held that GARA’s rolling provision was properly
applied and plaintiffs’ claims were not barred.38
B. INTACT INSURANCE CO. V. PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP.
IRREVOCABLE TRUST
In Intact Insurance Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. Irrevocable Trust,
plaintiffs brought suit against the Piper Aircraft Corporation Ir-
revocable Trust, seeking contribution for money paid to satisfy
claims resulting from an airplane crash in Canada.39 Plaintiffs
brought their claims pursuant to a “Channeling Injunction” is-
sued several years earlier during bankruptcy proceedings for
Piper Aircraft Corporation.40 Under the Channeling Injunction,
any claims against Piper Aircraft Corporation after the bank-
ruptcy had to be pursued against the Trust.41
The Trust moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by GARA’s statute of repose.42
Plaintiffs responded that GARA should not bar their claims be-
cause “(1) but for the Trust Agreement’s channeling injunction,
Plaintiffs’ lawsuit would have been filed in Canada, beyond the
reach of GARA’s statutory provisions; and (2) GARA’s applica-
tion in this matter would be inequitable, unfair and violate
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”43
The court was unpersuaded by either argument. The court
characterized the Trust Agreement’s jurisdictional requirement
as “a de facto forum selection clause, which are deemed presump-
36 Id. at *4.
37 Id. at *4–5.
38 Id.
39 Intact Ins. Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. Irrevocable Trust, No. 15-24792-CV,
2017 WL 3328225, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2017), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 15-24792-CIV, 2017 WL 3328170 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017), appeal dis-
missed sub nom., R&Q Ins. (Malta Ltd.) v. Piper Aircraft Corp. Irrevocable Trust,
No. 17-13989-CC, 2017 WL 8223248 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2017).
40 Id. at *1–2.
41 Id. at *2.
42 Id.
43 Id. at *4.
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tively valid by the United States Supreme Court.”44 Plaintiffs
even conceded that channeling injunctions are a permissible
tool used in bankruptcy proceedings.45 But even if Canadian law
did apply, the court observed that GARA’s statute of repose
would still operate to bar the claim under the Supremacy
Clause.46
The court similarly rejected plaintiffs’ argument that applica-
tion of GARA’s statute of repose would violate plaintiffs’ consti-
tutional rights. Notably, plaintiffs failed to cite any authority
supporting this argument.47 The court reasoned that plaintiffs
could not “defeat pre-trial dismissal of a lawsuit merely because
[they are] unhappy with the accompanying result[.]”48 Judg-
ment on the pleadings was therefore appropriate.
III. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
A. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS
1. Hickcox-Huffman v. US Airways, Inc.
In Hickcox-Huffman v. US Airways, Inc., the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered whether the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempts
state law claims arising out of lost or delayed luggage.49 Plaintiff
sued US Airways for the return of the $15 checked bag fee after
her bag was delivered a day late to her destination.50 Plaintiff’s
complaint included a breach of contract claim for violation of
US Airways’ “Terms of Transportation,” which stated that “ ‘US
Airways has voluntarily established a program setting standards
for service levels’ regarding baggage, and has ‘committed to . . .
[p]rovide on-time baggage delivery’ and ‘[m]ake prompt re-
funds.’”51 The district court ruled that plaintiff’s claims related
to a US Airways “service” and were thus preempted by the
ADA.52
On appeal, the court noted that the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that breach of contract claims are not preempted where
the claims are based upon an airline’s “voluntarily assumed obli-
44 Id. (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991)).
45 Id.
46 Id. at *5.
47 Id. at *7.
48 Id.
49 Hickcox-Huffman v. US Airways, Inc., 855 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017).
50 Id.
51 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
52 Id. at 1060.
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gations” as opposed to state requirements.53 Although states
could not impose regulations regarding fares, routes, and ser-
vices, they could afford relief if an airline voluntarily created an
obligation, “even when the obligations directly relate to fares,
routes, and services.”54 The key question facing the Hickox court
was whether plaintiff properly pleaded that US Airways had vol-
untarily entered into a contract.55
The court determined that US Airways’ Terms of Transporta-
tion constituted “a routine offer of a unilateral contract subject
to being accepted by flying on US Airways.”56 The court rea-
soned that the “delayed baggage” policy in the Terms of Trans-
portation was triggered if US Airways “fail[ed] to return
checked baggage upon arrival at the destination.”57 The court
also found that the fifteen dollar baggage fee plaintiff paid con-
stituted consideration for delivery “upon her arrival at her desti-
nation.”58 The court concluded that plaintiff properly pleaded a
breach of contract (i.e., the Terms of Transportation) when she
alleged that US Airways failed to deliver her bag upon arrival.59
The court rejected US Airways’ argument that allowing plain-
tiff to prevail would require airlines “to deliver checked baggage
on-time or to provide that service for free.”60 The court observed
that checked baggage policies vary from one airline to the other
and emphasized that “[n]o state law made US Airways promise
timely delivery of the first bag for $15.”61 The court vacated and
remanded the matter to the district court.62
B. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SERVICE?
1. Fawemimo v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Fawemimo v. American Airlines, Inc., a pro se plaintiff sued
American Airlines after striking her head on a video monitor
while taking her seat.63 Plaintiff alleged that American was negli-
53 Id. at 1061 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228–30
(1995)).
54 Id. at 1062 (citation omitted).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1063.
57 Id. (emphasis in original).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id. at 1066.
62 Id.
63 Fawemimo v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 14-CV-4510 (PKC), 2017 WL 398387, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2017).
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gent by failing to provide safe seating conditions and failing to
warn passengers about the dangers of aircraft video monitors.64
In addition to money damages, plaintiff sought injunctive relief
requiring greater distance between aircraft seating and walls and
a contrasting paint scheme between walls and monitors.65 Amer-
ican moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s
claims were preempted by the ADA.66
The court employed the three-factor Rombom test—first em-
ployed by United States Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor
as a district judge—to determine whether plaintiff’s claims were
preempted.67 Under Rombom, the court asks (1) whether the un-
derlying activity is an airline service; (2) whether plaintiff’s claim
directly affects the service, rather than “tenuously, remotely, or
peripherally”; and (3) whether the airline’s tortious conduct was
“reasonably necessary to the provision of the service.”68 The
court determined that the design and placement of the video
monitors satisfied the Rombom test.
First, the court agreed that the purpose of the video moni-
tor—to provide safety demonstrations and in-flight entertain-
ment—fit within the category of an airline service under the
ADA.69 Second, the court observed that plaintiff’s claims were
directly related to that service because plaintiff sought to regu-
late the design and placement of the monitor and its surround-
ings.70 Finally, the court found that the airline’s decision to
place the monitor near passengers “was essential to the provi-
sion of safety-instruction videos and in-flight entertainment.”71
The court also found that the video monitors were subject to
federal regulations.72 Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim was pre-
empted by the ADA.73
2. Hekmat v. U.S. Transporationa Security Administration
In Hekmat v. U.S. Transportation Security Administration, plain-




67 Id. at *3.






73 Id. at *4.
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ministration (TSA) after losing $95,000 worth of jewelry
plaintiffs had placed in their checked luggage.74 JetBlue argued
that plaintiffs’ various tort claims were preempted by the ADA.75
As in Fawemimo above, the court employed the Rombom test to
determine whether the claims were preempted.76
Applying the first prong, the court determined that JetBlue’s
handling of plaintiffs’ luggage did indeed constitute a “ser-
vice.”77 The court also held that plaintiffs’ claims affected the
service directly because the claims specifically challenged Jet-
Blue’s policies related to baggage handling.78 Finally, the court
determined that plaintiffs’ claims satisfied the third prong be-
cause the alleged tortious conduct (baggage handling) is “rea-
sonably necessary to the provision of the service.”79
Although plaintiffs attempted to recast the underlying tor-
tious conduct as theft—which the court conceded might not be
preempted by the ADA—the court found that plaintiffs failed to
accuse JetBlue of theft and claimed negligence instead.80 Thus,
plaintiffs’ tort claims were preempted by the ADA.
3. Shin v. American Airlines Group, Inc.
In Shin v. American Airlines Group, Inc., the court considered
the applicability of preemption where state law prevents parties
from disclaiming legal obligations. Plaintiff sued American Air-
lines and others after he was denied permission to board a
flight.81 Claiming he was singled out because of his race, plain-
tiff filed claims for, among other things, equal rights violations
under § 198182 and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.83 Defendants moved to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6).
74 Hekmat v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 247 F. Supp. 3d 427, 430 (S.D.N.Y.
2017).
75 Id. at 431.
76 Id. at 431–32 (citations omitted).
77 Id. at 432.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 432–33.
80 Id. at 433.
81 Shin v. Am. Airlines Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-2234-ARR-JO, 2017 WL 3316129,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017) appeal filed, No. 17-2735 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2017).
82 Id. The court held that plaintiff’s bare assertion that he was treated differ-
ently from white passengers did not “give rise to an inference of unlawful discrim-
ination” in violation of § 1981. Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
83 Id. at *1.
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After disposing of plaintiff’s other claims, the court turned to
plaintiff’s allegation that defendants breached “implied
promises that [p]laintiff would . . . not [be] discriminated
against.”84 The court explained that preemption of plaintiff’s
contract claim depended on whether the obligation allegedly
breached was required by the state or undertaken voluntarily by
defendants.85 But the court also noted that if a state does not
permit the parties to “free themselves from the covenant, a
breach of contract claim is pre-empted.”86 Stated differently, if
state law prevents the parties from disclaiming an implied con-
tractual obligation, a suit for breach of the implied obligation
will be preempted.
The court recognized that New York law does not permit par-
ties to contract out of (i.e., disclaim) the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.87 Plaintiff’s implied breach of con-
tract claim was therefore preempted by the ADA.88
4. Watson v. Air Methods Corp.
In Watson v. Air Methods Corp., the Eighth Circuit examined
whether the ADA preempted an air carrier employee’s claims
for wrongful discharge under Missouri common law.89 Plaintiff,
a flight paramedic, filed suit against Air Methods in state court
alleging he was fired in retaliation for revealing safety violations
at the company.90 Plaintiff claimed that his status as a
“whistleblower” precluded the company from firing him “for re-
porting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors or public
authorities.”91 After removing the matter to federal court, Air
Methods moved to dismiss, arguing that the ADA preempted
plaintiff’s state law wrongful discharge claim.92 Relying on the
Eight Circuit’s decision in Botz v. Omni Air International,93 the
district court granted the motion, and a panel from the Eighth





89 Watson v. Air Methods Corp., 870 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter
Watson II] (en banc).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 814–15 (citing Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92
(Mo. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Id. at 815.
93 286 F.3d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 2002), overruled by Watson II, 870 F.3d 812 (8th
Cir. 2017).
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Circuit affirmed.94 The Eighth Circuit granted rehearing en
banc to determine whether to reconsider its holding in Botz.95
In Botz, a flight attendant sued for violation of the Minnesota
whistleblower-protection statute after purportedly being termi-
nated for refusing to fly an assignment that violated federal reg-
ulations.96 The court concluded that the claims were preempted
because the Minnesota statute related to “service of an air car-
rier” within the meaning of the ADA.97 The court reasoned that
the flight attendant’s refusal to fly created a “significant likeli-
hood” that the airline would have to cancel the flight, and the
Minnesota statute’s authorization of her refusal constituted “a
forbidden connection with an air carrier’s service.”98 The Botz
court further explained that its ADA analysis was “bolstered by
Congress’s enactment of the [Whistleblower Protection Pro-
gram],” which was designed to protect air carrier employees
who report safety violations.99 The court viewed the
whistleblower program as proof that Congress intended for the
ADA to preempt the type of state law claims asserted by
plaintiff.100
The Watson II court noted that while Botz was the first federal
appellate ruling regarding preemption of whistleblower lawsuits,
other circuits have since rejected Botz’s holding.101 The court ul-
timately agreed with the other circuit courts, overturning Botz
and holding that “any effect of Missouri wrongful-discharge
claims on the contractual arrangement between an air carrier
and the user of its service is too tenuous, remote, or peripheral
to deem the claims expressly pre-empted by the ADA.”102 The
court cited the following reasons in support of its decision:
(1) Forcing an air carrier to retain an employee would not
“significantly impact” the carrier’s service relationship
with its customers;
94 See Watson v. Air Methods Corp., 834 F.3d 891, 892 (8th Cir. 2016), rev’d per
curiam, 870 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Watson I].
95 Watson II, 870 F.3d at 815.
96 Botz, 286 F.3d at 489–90.
97 Id. at 494.
98 Id. at 495.
99 Id. at 497.
100 Id.
101 Watson II, 870 F.3d at 816 (“[T]he Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits each
rejected Botz’s view that the ADA expressly pre-empts whistleblower claims based
on post hoc air-safety reports.”).
102 Id. at 818.
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(2) A post hoc complaint by a whistleblower is not likely to can-
cel any flights, but instead trigger an investigation by the
FAA;
(3) A wrongful discharge claim, like a race discrimination
claim, would not frustrate the ADA’s primary objective of
promoting competition among air carriers;
(4) State laws related to safety are not tantamount to laws re-
lated to “service,” and there is no evidence showing that
safety laws have a significant impact on service; and
(5) The “mere existence of a federal enforcement mecha-
nism” (i.e., the Whistleblower Protection Program) does
not imply preemption.103
The Watson II decision brings the Eighth Circuit in line with
the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which the court noted
contain “important airline hubs” and over a third of the coun-
try’s populace.104
C. PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATORY SCHEMES
1. EagleMed LLC v. Cox
In EagleMed LLC v. Cox, the Tenth Circuit considered an ap-
peal from the district court’s holding that a state regulatory
schedule for reimbursement of air ambulance services was pre-
empted by the ADA.105 Under the Wyoming Worker’s Compen-
sation Act (Worker’s Comp Act), the Wyoming Department of
Workforce Services is responsible for managing the state work-
ers’ compensation fund and allocating payments from the
fund.106 The Worker’s Comp Act provides, in relevant part, that
“the division shall allow a reasonable charge for the ambulance
service at a rate not in excess of the rate schedule established by
the director under the procedure set forth for payment of medi-
cal and hospital care.”107 Pursuant to the Worker’s Comp Act,
the agency promulgated a rate schedule for ambulance services,
including air ambulance services.108 Several air ambulance ser-
vice providers filed suit, arguing that the ADA preempts the
Worker’s Comp Act “to the extent the statute and regulation set
compensation that air ambulances may receive for their ser-
103 Id. at 818–19.
104 Id. at 819.
105 EagleMed LLC v. Cox, 868 F.3d 893, 896 (10th Cir. 2017).
106 Id. at 897.
107 Id. at 898 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-401(e)).
108 Id.
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vices.”109 After a series of motions, the district court granted
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and entered an order
requiring the agency to pay air ambulance providers “the full
amount charged for air ambulance services.”110
On appeal, defendants argued that the district court erred for
two reasons: (1) the rate schedule was not mandatory, but in-
stead provided air ambulance providers with the option of ei-
ther seeking reimbursement through the Worker’s Comp Act or
from the injured worker directly; and (2) the preemption issue
presented a question of material fact as to whether the Worker’s
Comp Act and rate schedule had a “significant and adverse ef-
fect” on air ambulance prices in Wyoming.111 The court first
noted that while the ADA does preempt state enforcement ac-
tions related to “airline rates, routes, or services,”112 it does not
preempt enforcement of contractual obligations “that the air-
line voluntarily agreed to[.]”113 Defendants seized upon this dis-
tinction by claiming that air ambulance providers were
essentially given two options: voluntarily agree to submit the bill
to the agency at the rates provided in the rate schedule or tender
the entire bill to the injured worker.114
The court disagreed, finding that the statutory language made
it clear that the Worker’s Comp Act was “intended to establish a
universally applicable system for managing all in-state workers’
compensation claims.”115 Furthermore, nothing in the Worker’s
Comp Act suggested that the compensation scheme was in-
tended to operate as a “voluntary contractual offer” that air am-
bulance providers and others could opt into.116 The court
further explained that defendants’ interpretation was contrary
to the statute’s very purpose, ensuring “that [the] industry, not
an individual, bears the burden of an accident and injury that
has occurred within the industrial setting.”117
The court also affirmed the district court’s summary judg-
ment ruling, holding that the Worker’s Comp Act “expressly es-
109 Id.
110 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111 Id. at 899.
112 Id. (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383–84
(1992)).
113 Id. (citing Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995)).
114 Id. at 900.
115 Id. (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 900–01.
117 Id. at 901 (citing Wright v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div.,
952 P.2d 209, 212 (Wyo. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tablish[ed] a mandatory fixed maximum rate that will be paid
by the State for air-ambulance services provided to injured work-
ers[.]”118 Thus, the court negated any need to decide (as a mat-
ter of fact) whether the rate schedule had a significant effect on
rates, routes, or services.
IV. MONTREAL & WARSAW CONVENTIONS
A. PREEMPTION
1. Alam v. American Airlines Group, Inc.
In Alam v. American Airlines Group, Inc., plaintiffs brought fed-
eral and state discrimination claims, along with other state law
claims, after being removed from a New York-bound flight in
Toronto.119 Plaintiffs alleged that a flight attendant wrongfully
ordered them to deplane just after they had boarded the air-
craft.120 Plaintiffs were instead booked on the next available
flight to New York.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that discrimination
claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention.121 In King v.
American Airlines, Inc., the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs’
discrimination claims were preempted under the Warsaw Con-
vention because they had already received their boarding passes
and were being transported from the terminal to the aircraft.122
The Second Circuit determined that the claims fell within the
ambit of Article 17, and were therefore preempted, because “the
events in question occurred in the course of embarkation[.]”123
The Alam court determined that the facts and circumstances
giving rise to plaintiffs’ discrimination claims similarly occurred
after plaintiffs had obtained their boarding passes and boarded
the flight.124 In other words, plaintiffs’ alleged injuries occurred
during “the operations of embarking” the aircraft and were thus
preempted by the Montreal Convention.125
118 Id. at 902.
119 Alam v. Am. Airlines Group, Inc., No. 16-CV-00251 (DLI) (ST), 2017 WL
1048073, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2017).
120 Id. at *2.
121 Id.; King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002).
122 King, 284 F.3d at 359.
123 Id. at 358.
124 Alam, 2017 WL 1048073, at *4.
125 Id.
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2. Sanches-Naek v. TAP Portugal, Inc.
In Sanches-Naek v. TAP Portugal, Inc., plaintiffs sued TAP Portu-
gal after being removed from a Portugal-bound flight prior to
departing John F. Kennedy International Airport.126 Plaintiffs
claimed that they were wrongfully removed from the flight,
which caused them to miss subsequent connecting flights and
“completely ruined” their vacation.127 Plaintiffs brought a num-
ber of state law claims, including intentional misrepresentation,
negligence, slander, malicious prosecution, breach of contract,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.128 Plaintiffs also
brought claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for “discrimi-
natory practices and treatment.”129
TAP Portugal moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims
were precluded by the Montreal Convention.130 Plaintiffs coun-
tered that the Montreal Convention did not preempt or pre-
clude their state law claims because they sought only economic
damages—not personal injury damages.131 The court sided with
TAP Portugal, citing long-standing precedent to show that al-
lowing a passenger to bring a claim under local law where the
Montreal Convention does not allow recovery would “encourage
artful pleading by plaintiffs seeking to opt out of the Conven-
tion’s liability scheme when local law promised recovery in ex-
cess of that prescribed by the treaty.”132 All of plaintiffs’ state law
claims were preempted because each of the claims arose from a
single “damaging event,”133 which occurred during the embark-
ing process of an international flight.134 The court also held,
pursuant to Second Circuit precedent, that plaintiffs’ § 1981
and § 1983 claims were preempted by the Montreal
Convention.135
126 Sanches-Naek v. TAP Port., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 3d 185, 188–89 (D. Conn.
2017).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 189.
129 Id. at 189–90 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130 Id. at 188.
131 Id. at 191.
132 Id. (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 171
(1999)).
133 Id. (citing Yanovskiy v. Air France, 173 F.3d 848 (2d Cir. 1999)).
134 Id. at 193 (citing King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir.
2002)).
135 Id. at 191–92 (citations omitted).
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Plaintiffs’ failure to allege any physical or bodily injuries, as
required under Article 17, led the court to conclude that the
claims were precluded by the Montreal Convention.136
3. Patel v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd.
In Patel v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., the court analyzed the inter-
play between the concept of applicability of the Montreal Con-
vention and the concept of liability under the Montreal
Convention. Plaintiff was an elderly woman, originally from In-
dia but residing in California, who booked roundtrip airfare
from San Francisco to India.137 Prior to the flight, plaintiff mis-
placed her U.S. passport and instead arrived at the airport with
her Indian passport.138 Plaintiff was permitted to board the
flight even though the Indian passport had been canceled.139
Plaintiff was denied entry into India due to the canceled pass-
port and was immediately booked on a return flight to San
Francisco.140
Plaintiff sued Singapore Airlines for negligence, claiming “se-
vere back pain, emotional trauma, and headaches as a result” of
the long return flight.141 Singapore Airlines moved for summary
judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was preempted and
barred by the Montreal Convention.142 Plaintiff contended that
the Montreal Convention did not apply because she had not yet
“embarked” on the plane when Singapore Airlines allowed her
to board with a canceled passport.143 Under this theory, the “ac-
cident” that caused her injury occurred outside the scope of the
Montreal Convention.144
The court disagreed, stating that “plaintiff’s argument ‘erro-
neously conflate[s] the applicability of the Convention with liabil-
ity under the Convention.’”145 The court noted that “the
question whether an injury-causing accident occurred on board
136 Id. at 196.
137 Patel v. Sing. Airlines, Ltd., No. CV 15-4205 FMO (PLAx), 2017 WL





141 Id. (citation omitted).
142 Id. at *3.
143 Id. at *4.
144 Id.
145 Id. (citing Acevedo-Reinoso v. Iberia Lı´neas Ae´reas de Espan˜a S.A., 449 F.3d
7, 13 (1st Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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or in the course of embarking or disembarking bears upon lia-
bility” as it is “analytically distinct from the antecedent question
whether the Convention applies[.]”146 Simply put, whether the
“accident” (plaintiff being allowed to board with a canceled
passport) occurred before or after embarking the flight is irrele-
vant to the question of whether the Montreal Convention gov-
erns the claim.147
The court concluded that plaintiff’s negligence claim was pre-
empted because her injury occurred aboard the aircraft, mean-
ing that Article 17 provided the exclusive means for recovery.148
But plaintiff could not establish that an “accident” had occurred
within the meaning of the Montreal Convention and therefore
could not recover from the airline.149 Even though the Montreal
Convention applied to plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff could not show
that the airline was liable under the Montreal Convention.
B. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN “ACCIDENT”?
As shown in Patel, the question of whether an “accident” has
occurred within the meaning of Article 17 often decides the out-
come. Article 17 provides: “[t]he carrier is liable for damage sus-
tained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon
condition only that the accident which caused the death or in-
jury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking.”150
In Air France v. Saks, the Supreme Court determined that lia-
bility under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention (the predeces-
sor to the Montreal Convention) arose only if “a passenger’s
injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happen-
ing that is external to the passenger.”151 But in cases where the
injury results from “the passenger’s own internal reaction to the
usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, in which
case [the injury] has not been caused by an accident.”152
The cases below highlight the nuances involved in proving
the occurrence of an Article 17 accident. The analysis often
146 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 Id. at *5.
149 Id.
150 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, art. 17, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734, at
*16–17.
151 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
152 Id. at 406.
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turns on whether an unusual or unexpected event has occurred
and whether the plaintiff’s response can be categorized as inter-
nal or external.
1. Yang v. Air China Ltd.
In Yang v. Air China Ltd., plaintiff’s mother collapsed on the
jet bridge and died while deplaning an overnight Air China
flight from Boston.153 There were no eyewitnesses to the dece-
dent’s collapse, and flight attendants learned of the incident
only after someone alerted them that a passenger had fainted
on the jet bridge.154 One of the flight attendants then saw the
decedent lying on the jet bridge just beyond the cabin door.155
The Health Bureau of Beijing issued a death certificate, listing
the cause of death as a pulmonary embolism and possible heart
attack.156 Plaintiff’s medical expert opined that the decedent
slipped while stepping from the aircraft onto the jet bridge,
causing her to fall and die.157 Plaintiff argued that the fall was
therefore an “accident” within the meaning of the Montreal
Convention and Air China was liable for the fall.158 Plaintiff re-
lied upon the medical expert’s opinion that the decedent died
as a result of an external cause (the fall on the jet bridge) rather
than an internal cause (pulmonary embolism or a heart at-
tack).159 Defendants Air China and Boeing each moved to strike
plaintiff’s expert and moved for summary judgment on the basis
that plaintiff could not establish that decedent’s fall was precipi-
tated by an external cause.160
The court granted the motion to strike, determining that the
expert’s testimony was not sufficiently reliable to establish
whether decedent fell before or after exiting the aircraft
door.161 The court also found that the expert’s theory regarding
the cause of death—head trauma as a result of the fall—was sim-




156 Id. at *2.
157 Id. at *4.
158 Id. at *5.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at *6.
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ilarly unreliable.162 The expert had even conceded that a heart
attack or other internal factor could have caused her to fall.163
The court further held that even if the expert’s testimony
were permitted, it would not “reliably narrow down the cause of
[the decedent’s] death to an ‘accident’ that would allow [plain-
tiff] to succeed at trial.”164 Without reliable testimony—or some
other evidence to substantiate liability—plaintiff’s theory of cau-
sation was simply too speculative to show that the decedent’s
death resulted from an Article 17 accident.165
2. Lee v. Air Canada
In Lee v. Air Canada, a passenger sued Air Canada after being
hit with a bag that another passenger was loading into the over-
head bin during boarding.166 When the incident occurred, flight
attendants were stationed in the cabin assisting with the board-
ing process but were not assisting passengers with stowing lug-
gage.167 Air Canada moved for summary judgment on the basis
that plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by an accident under the
Montreal Convention.168
Air Canada did not dispute that the incident was an external
and unexpected event.169 Rather, Air Canada asserted that there
was no causal link between Air Canada and the incident that
injured plaintiff.170 Air Canada argued that an accident did not
occur because plaintiff’s injuries were caused by another passen-
ger.171 Air Canada noted that in other cases involving items fall-
ing from overhead bins, the incidents occurred “only after the
flight crew’s responsibility to secure the items in those bins had
been triggered.”172 In this case, the airline argued that the flight
attendants were not responsible for the supervision and stowing
162 Id. at *7.
163 Id.
164 Id. at *11.
165 Id. (citation omitted).
166 Lee v. Air Can., 228 F. Supp. 3d 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
167 Id. at 304–05.
168 Id. at 304.
169 Id. at 309.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 310.
172 Id. at 309–10 (citing Maxwell v. Aer Lingus Ltd., 122 F. Supp. 2d 210,
212–13 (D. Mass. 2000); Smith v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. C 09-02903, 2009 WL
3072449, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009)) (emphasis in original).
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of luggage, nor were they in a position to prevent the passenger
from dropping his bag on plaintiff.173
The court rejected the notion that a “causal connection” be-
tween the carrier and the incident is required to establish an
accident under the Montreal Convention.174 The court found
that flight attendants were stationed throughout the cabin and
that at least one flight attendant witnessed the incident.175 More-
over, Air Canada was better positioned than plaintiff to control
risks associated with bags falling from the overhead bin, includ-
ing the ability to warn passengers to take care when stowing
items.176 The court concluded the incident was an “unexpected
or unusual event” that was external to plaintiff.177 Thus, the inci-
dent was indeed an “accident” within the meaning of Article 17.
3. Lynn v. United Airlines, Inc.
In Lynn v. United Airlines, Inc., plaintiff’s flight was on final
descent for landing when she noticed that an overhead bin
across the aisle had come unlatched.178 Plaintiff was admittedly
aware that the seatbelt sign was illuminated and that it was un-
safe to move about the cabin but, nevertheless, stood up to close
the overhead bin.179 As she reached out to close the bin, the
aircraft touched down, wrenching her arm and fracturing her
shoulder.180 United Airlines moved for summary judgment, ar-
guing plaintiff was not injured by an “accident” under the Mon-
treal Convention because: (1) no “unexpected or unusual
event” occurred that was “external” to plaintiff; and (2) plain-
tiff’s decision to leave her seat disconnected the causal chain.181
United Airlines first asserted that plaintiff’s injury could not
be considered an accident because her injury was not caused by
an unusual or unexpected event.182 The court, however, found
that United’s theory failed to consider all of the circumstances
that surrounded plaintiff’s injury, particularly when there were
“genuine material issues” regarding how unexpected it is for an




177 Id. at 311.
178 Lynn v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 15-CV-7041, 2017 WL 4357387, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2017).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at *2–4.
182 Id. at *2.
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overhead bin to open during descent.183 As such, a reasonable
jury could conclude that the overhead bin popping open was an
unusual or unexpected event.184
United also argued that plaintiff’s decision to leave her seat
during an otherwise normal descent and landing was an “inter-
nal response” rather than an external event.185 The court dis-
agreed with what it termed an “overly restrictive approach to the
evidence,” finding that a jury could reasonably conclude that
the “external event” was the bin popping open during
descent.186
Finally, United claimed it could not be liable under Article 17
because plaintiff’s voluntary decision to leave her seat broke the
chain of causation involving United Airlines and its crew mem-
bers.187 The court rejected this theory, reasoning that the deter-
mination as to whether plaintiff leaving her seat severed the
causal chain was best left for the jury decide.188 This was particu-
larly true where one could reasonably conclude that plaintiff’s
decision to close the overhead bin was “a foreseeable result of
the bin popping open.”189 The court ultimately denied summary
judgment, leaving it for the jury to decide whether an accident
had occurred within the meaning of the Montreal Convention.
4. Dizon v. Asiana Airlines, Inc.
In Dizon v. Asiana Airlines, Inc., plaintiff sued Asiana Airlines
for, among other things, violations of the Montreal Convention
after suffering from deep vein thrombosis during multiple legs
of an international trip.190 Asiana filed a motion for summary
judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s injury was not caused by an
accident because his deep vein thrombosis “was the result of
normal and expected operations of the aircraft.”191 Plaintiff ar-
gued that Asiana “ignor[ed] other links in the causal chain,” in-
cluding the alleged failure of flight attendants to respond to his
requests for assistance.192




187 Id. at *4.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Dizon v. Asiana Airlines, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1038–39 (C.D. Cal.
2017).
191 Id. at 1041.
192 Id.
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The court began by acknowledging that an airline employee’s
failure to act can constitute an accident under the Montreal
Convention.193 For example, in Olympic Airways v. Husain, the
Supreme Court held that an air carrier could be liable where a
flight attendant refused to reseat an asthmatic passenger who
was allergic to the cigarette smoke emanating from the aircraft’s
smoking section.194 The Supreme Court found that “the flight
attendant’s refusal to reseat the passenger was a ‘link in the
chain’ that ultimately led to his death, though the ambient
smoke in the cabin was also a cause.”195 The Dizon court also
considered Air France v. Saks, where the Supreme Court held
that a passenger’s loss of hearing during the normal descent of
the aircraft was her “own internal reaction to the usual, normal,
and expected operation of the aircraft.”196 The Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia Ltd. was also relevant be-
cause it held that deep vein thrombosis was not an accident “be-
cause it is an injury that arises due to the normal and expected
operation of the aircraft.”197
The court distinguished the facts of Rodriguez, emphasizing
that the plaintiff in that case failed to inform the flight crew of
her injury, whereas plaintiff in the present case did raise the is-
sue with flight attendants.198 Indeed, plaintiff characterized the
“accident” as “the flight crew’s failure to adequately attend to his
medical needs,” rather than the deep vein thrombosis itself.199
The court found that the facts of plaintiff’s case “fall directly in
the area between Husain and Rodriguez.”200 Like the plaintiff in
Husain, plaintiff in the present case informed the flight attend-
ants of his medical issues.201 But unlike the flight attendants in
Husain, Asiana’s flight attendants did provide medical assistance
to plaintiff in the form of Tylenol and wheelchair assistance.202
The issue turned on whether the airline’s response was “so insuf-
ficient as to be considered an unusual or unexpected event.”203
193 Id.
194 Id. (citing Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 654–55 (2004)).
195 Id. at 1042 (citing Husain, 540 U.S. at 653–54).
196 Id. at 1042 (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 406 (1985)).
197 Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Ansett Austl. Ltd., 383 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir.
2004).
198 Id. at 1042–43.
199 Id. at 1042.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1043.
202 Id.
203 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court found no evidence that flight attendants had ignored
plaintiff’s requests and granted Asiana’s motion for summary
judgment.204
C. FORUM SELECTION
1. In re Air Crash at San Francisco, California, on July 6,
2013
In re Air Crash at San Francisco, California, on July 6, 2013 arose
from the July 2013 crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 at San
Francisco International Airport.205 Asiana moved to dismiss the
claims of two Chinese passengers on the basis that the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction.206 Under Article 33 of the Montreal Conven-
tion, a passenger must bring suit in one of five jurisdictions: (1)
the domicile of the carrier; (2) the principal place of business of
the carrier; (3) the place of business where the contract was
made; (4) the place of final destination; or (5) the principal and
permanent residence of the passenger.207 If a passenger cannot
show that at least one of the five places listed above is in the
United States, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is
appropriate.208 Plaintiffs focused on the fourth and fifth prongs
as the basis for jurisdiction in the United States.
For purposes of Article 33, the “final destination” for a round-
trip flight is the place of origin.209 Plaintiffs argued, however,
that they were not operating on a roundtrip ticket but instead
on “open jaw itineraries.”210 Plaintiffs’ theory was that one “jaw”
of the trip was the flight from China to San Francisco, with the
second jaw being the return flight from Los Angeles to China.211
This theory hinged on the fact that plaintiffs were arriving in
San Francisco, driving to Los Angeles, and then returning to
China from Los Angeles.212 Plaintiffs argued that this consti-
tuted two separate contracts for transportation, with San Fran-
204 Id. at 1044–45.
205 In re Air Crash at S.F., Cal., on July 6, 2013, 14-CV-02038, 2017 WL 3484643,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017).
206 Id.
207 Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
208 Id.
209 Id. at *4.
210 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
211 Id.
212 Id.
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cisco being the final destination for the first contract.213 Asiana,
on the other hand, argued that that the entire trip should be
considered a “single undivided transportation” with the ultimate
destination of Shanghai.214
The court sided with the airline, finding that the parties
clearly “contemplated a single operation of undivided operation
transportation.”215 The court noted that each plaintiff had (1)
purchased airline tickets through a single contract; (2) for trans-
portation by one carrier (Asiana); and (3) were issued at the
same time and place.216 Moreover, the entire trip was to take
place within a two-week period.217 Accordingly, the court deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims
under the “place of destination” prong.218
Plaintiffs also claimed that jurisdiction was proper in the
United States under the “principal and permanent residence”
prong, because they resided in the United States for a period of
time while receiving medical care.219 The court rejected this ar-
gument, finding that Article 33 permits jurisdiction at the pas-
senger’s principal and permanent residence “at the time of the
accident.”220 Thus, even if plaintiffs could establish that three
months of medical care constituted principal and permanent
residence, the court still would not have jurisdiction because
plaintiffs resided in China when the accident occurred.221 The
court determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction
under Article 33 and granted Asiana’s motion.222
2. Sajajed v. Emirates Airlines
In Sajajed v. Emirates Airlines, plaintiff sued after airline staff
caused plaintiff—an Iranian citizen with permanent residence
in the United States—to be burned by hot tea during a flight
from Dubai to San Francisco.223 When the incident occurred,
plaintiff was traveling under an itinerary that included legs from
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
216 Id. at *6.
217 Id.
218 Id. at *7.
219 Id.
220 Id. (emphasis added).
221 Id.
222 Id. at *7–8.
223 Sajajed v. Emirates Airlines, No. C 16-06659 SBA, 2017 WL 1150403, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2017).
2018] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 219
Iran to Dubai, Dubai to San Francisco, San Francisco to Dubai,
and Dubai to Iran.224 Plaintiff would routinely purchase round-
trip tickets from Iran to the United States with an open return
date to Iran.225 Emirates removed the case to federal court and
moved to dismiss, asserting that the court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention.226
The Warsaw Convention allowed plaintiff to bring suit in one
of four locations: (1) the airline’s domicile; (2) the airline’s
principal place of business; (3) the place where the ticket was
purchased; or (4) the passenger’s destination.227 The dispute
centered on whether plaintiff’s place of destination was Iran or
the United States.228 The court determined that plaintiff’s final
destination was indeed Iran because that was the location where
her roundtrip journey began.229
Plaintiff attempted to circumvent this fact by arguing that Iran
could not be the place of destination because “the United States
does not have diplomatic or consular relations with Iran and [ ]
there is no direct commercial air service between the two coun-
tries.”230 The court found no authority supporting this proposi-
tion and noted that the lack of direct flights and diplomatic
relations did not prevent plaintiff from actually buying a ticket
that took her from the United States to Iran.231
Plaintiff also sought to invoke the Montreal Convention,
which allows for a fifth potential forum: the place of the passen-
ger’s “principal and permanent residence.”232 Setting aside
whether the United States was plaintiff’s principal and perma-
nent residence, the court held that the Montreal Convention
could not apply because Iran—the place of departure and place
of destination—was not a party to the Montreal Convention.233
Finally, plaintiff asked the court to find that the place of desti-
nation was the United States because that is the location where




227 Id. at *2.
228 Id. at *3.
229 See id. (“In the case of a roundtrip ticket, the destination is ‘the place where
the trip began.’” (citation omitted)).
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
233 Id.
234 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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though a passenger’s intent is accorded considerable weight in
ascertaining the final destination, when a contract is unambigu-
ous, the instrument alone is taken to express the intent of the
parties.”235 Because plaintiff’s itinerary clearly provided for
roundtrip transportation from Iran, with stops in Dubai and San
Francisco, the place of destination could be nowhere other than
Iran.236
In any case, the United States was not a proper forum for the
suit and the court dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
D. DELAY VS. NONPERFORMANCE
1. Shabotinsky v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG
In Shabotinsky v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, plaintiff filed suit when
he was rebooked on a later flight from Frankfurt to Tel Aviv
after his initial flight was canceled, which delayed his arrival by
several hours.237 Plaintiff asserted claims under Article 19 of the
Montreal Convention, which provides:
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the car-
riage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the
carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it
proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that
could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for it or them to take such measures.238
Lufthansa moved to dismiss, arguing that the Montreal Con-
vention does not govern issues arising before the flight’s depar-
ture and that plaintiff’s claim was thus governed by the airline’s
Conditions of Carriage.239 The court disagreed, finding that
“nothing in Article 19 of the Montreal Convention suggests that
it only applies to delays that occur after a plaintiff’s initial flight
takes off.”240
The fundamental question was whether the airline failed to
perform under the contract or simply delayed plaintiff’s arri-
235 Id. at *5 (citing Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indon., 363 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir.
2004)).
236 Id.
237 Shabotinsky v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1020–21
(N.D. Ill. 2017).
238 Id. at 1021 (citation omitted).
239 Id. at 1022.
240 Id. (quoting Dochak v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze LOT S.A., 189 F. Supp. 3d
798, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2016)).
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val.241 The court concluded that plaintiff had not alleged that
Lufthansa failed to transport him to Tel Aviv but instead alleged
that Lufthansa failed to transport him to Tel Aviv on time.242 As
such, plaintiff was not claiming nonperformance of a contract
(i.e., the Conditions of Carriage) but instead claiming delay
under the Montreal Convention.243
E. SCOPE OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
1. Brannen v. British Airways PLC
In Brannen v. British Airways PLC, plaintiff sued British Airways
after slipping and sustaining injuries while boarding a shuttle
bus between terminals at Heathrow Airport in the United King-
dom.244 Plaintiff argued that his injuries were sustained while
disembarking from his British Airways flight and embarking on
a Brussels Airlines flight and sought recovery under the Mon-
treal Convention.245 British Airways moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the Montreal Convention was inapplicable because
plaintiff’s injuries were not sustained during embarking or dis-
embarking as required by Article 17.246 To determine whether
the incident occurred during embarking or disembarking, the
court engaged in a three-part analysis that considered “the loca-
tion of the accident, the activity in which the injured person was
engaged, and the control by defendant of such injured person
at the location and during the activity taking place at the time of
the accident . . . .”247
The court first examined the location of the incident. The
court noted that plaintiff was not in an “exclusive area” when he
was injured but instead located in an area accessible to other
passengers.248 Additionally, plaintiff could not show that he was
in the process of embarking on another flight because he had
not yet arrived at the gate or received a boarding pass.249 Moreo-
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1023.
243 Id.
244 Brannen v. British Airways PLC, No. 1:17-cv-00714, 2017 WL 4953856, at *1
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2017).
245 Id. at *2.
246 Id. at *3.
247 Id. at *4 (quoting Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152,
155 (3d Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
248 Id. at *5.
249 Id.
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ver, plaintiff’s next flight had, in fact, been canceled.250 As such,
the location of the incident weighed in favor of dismissal.251
The court next considered British Airways’ level of control
over plaintiff at the time of the incident. Plaintiff argued that he
had been instructed by British Airways to “immediately” travel to
a different terminal via shuttle bus to get a boarding pass and
board the next flight.252 Plaintiff further claimed that the shuttle
bus system was operating as an agent of the airline for the pur-
pose of embarking on the next flight.253 The court disagreed
and instead found that British Airways’ mere instruction to
board the shuttle bus for another terminal was insufficient to
show the level of control necessary to demonstrate that plaintiff
was in the process of embarking or disembarking.254
Finally, the court held that plaintiff’s activity—boarding a
shuttle bus to another terminal—also weighed in favor of dis-
missal.255 The court again focused on the fact that plaintiff had
not yet obtained a boarding pass.256 Boarding a shuttle bus was
simply “too attenuated to the process of embarking on a
flight.”257
With all three factors weighing in favor of British Airways, the
court determined that the “[p]laintiff has failed to state a cogni-
zable claim under Article 17” and dismissed plaintiff’s claims.258
F. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
Courts have generally held that claims for emotional distress
and mental anguish are not permitted under the Montreal Con-
vention unless caused by a bodily injury. One of the most promi-
nent cases that courts cite for this proposition is Ehrlich v.
American Airlines, Inc.259 Although the Ehrlich court was interpret-
ing the Warsaw Convention—not the Montreal Convention—
courts have long held that opinions interpreting the Warsaw
Convention are useful in interpreting the Montreal Convention.





254 Id. at *6.
255 Id.
256 See id. (citation omitted).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 360 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2004).
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1. Ojide v. Air France
In Ojide v. Air France, plaintiffs filed suit under Articles 17 and
19 of the Montreal Convention after their luggage was mis-
placed during a flight from New York to Nigeria.260 Prior to
boarding, Plaintiffs checked four pieces of luggage, one of
which contained medication.261 Air France required plaintiffs to
check a carry-on bag containing additional prescription medica-
tion during a layover in Paris.262 When plaintiffs arrived in Nige-
ria, all five pieces of luggage were missing, including the bags
containing prescription medication.263 Plaintiffs alleged that the
lack of medication caused one of the plaintiffs to suffer from
dehydration, necessitating an early return to the United States,
which caused plaintiffs to miss two family burials in Nigeria.264
Although plaintiffs did eventually receive their luggage, plain-
tiffs claimed the bags were “severely damaged.”265
Plaintiffs filed claims for delayed luggage under Article 19
and claims for “dehydration, deprivation of food, and various
forms of emotional distress” under Article 17.266 Air France filed
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiffs’
claims for dehydration, food deprivation, or emotional distress
did not constitute “bodily injuries” under the Montreal
Convention.267
The court relied on prior cases to hold that neither dehydra-
tion nor food deprivation were bodily injuries under Article
17.268 The court further held that because plaintiffs could not
establish the occurrence of a physical injury, their emotional dis-
tress claims were barred under the Montreal Convention.269
2. Nwokeji v. Arik Air
In Nwokeji v. Arik Air, a passenger sued American Airlines and
Arik Air for breach of contract and intentional and negligent
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infliction of emotional distress.270 Plaintiff claimed, in relevant
part, that the airlines inflicted emotional distress upon him
when they delayed his return flight from Nigeria to Boston.271
Plaintiff alleged that the waiting area was uncomfortable and de-
void of any amenities but did not allege that he sustained any
bodily injuries.272 The airlines moved for summary judgment.
The court noted that the Montreal Convention does not allow
for recovery of emotional damages unless a passenger has suf-
fered a bodily injury.273 The court further observed that
“[c]ourts have repeatedly dismissed claims for purely emotional
injuries arising from delayed flights.”274 Having determined that
plaintiff “suffered no physical injury and never saw a medical
professional as a result of the experience,” the court held that
plaintiff could not establish a claim for emotional distress under
the Montreal Convention.275
3. Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C.
In Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., the Sixth Circuit issued an
opinion that seemingly departed from traditional interpreta-
tions of the Montreal Convention. The case arose from an Abu
Dhabi to Chicago Etihad Airways flight, during which plaintiff
pricked her finger on a hypodermic needle that was left in her
seatback pocket.276 Plaintiff’s physician prescribed a number of
medications for exposure to hepatitis, tetanus, and HIV, and or-
dered a series of tests over the following year.277 Plaintiff and her
husband sued the airline, alleging physical injury, loss of consor-
tium, and a variety of emotional and mental injuries.278 The dis-
trict court granted partial summary judgment in the airline’s
favor as to plaintiff’s claims for mental anguish and emotional
distress, observing that “recovery for mental injuries is permitted
only to the extent the distress is caused by the physical injuries
270 Nwokeji v. Arik Air, No. 15-10802-MLW, 2017 WL 4167433, at *1 (D. Mass.
Sept. 20, 2017).
271 Id.
272 Id. at *6.
273 Id. at *11 (citations omitted).
274 Id. (citations omitted).
275 Id.
276 Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 408–09 (6th Cir. 2017) [here-
inafter Doe I].
277 Id. at 410.
278 Id. at 409–10.
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sustained.”279 The district court also dismissed her husband’s
loss of consortium claim.280
On appeal, Etihad argued that plaintiff could only recover for
mental anguish under the Montreal Convention if the mental
anguish was caused by the bodily injury (i.e., being stuck by the
needle).281 The court began with the text of Article 17(1) of the
Montreal Convention, which states: “The carrier is liable for
damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger
upon condition only that the accident which caused the death
or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”282
Under Etihad’s reading, “in case of” was the equivalent of
“caused by,” which meant that plaintiff would have to prove that
an accident caused her bodily injury and that the mental
anguish arose from the injury.283 Etihad argued that even
though plaintiff did sustain a bodily injury—the pinprick—the
bodily injury itself did not cause her mental anguish.284 Rather,
plaintiff’s mental anguish was a result of the fear that she might
have been exposed to a disease.285 The court recognized that
Etihad’s argument was rooted in the Second Circuit’s decision
in Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., which, as noted above, had
spawned the conventional understanding that a plaintiff can
only recover for emotional damages if they were caused by a
bodily injury.286
The court declined to adopt the Ehrlich holding as a means to
interpret the Montreal Convention. The court noted the differ-
ing purposes of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions.287 For
instance, the Warsaw Convention was adopted in 1929 to limit
the liability of airlines “in order to foster the growth of the
fledgling commercial aviation industry,”288 while the Montreal
Convention was adopted in 1999 to offer a “modernized uni-
279 Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., No. 13-14358, 2015 WL 5936326, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 13, 2015), rev’d and remanded, 870 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
280 Doe I, 870 F.3d at 410.
281 Id. at 412–13.
282 Id. at 412 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
283 Id.
284 Id. at 412–13.
285 Id. at 413.
286 Id. at 414–15 (citing Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 369 (2d Cir.
2004)).
287 Id. at 426.
288 Id. at 416 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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form liability regime for international air transportation.”289
Given the dramatically different rationales for each treaty, the
court found Ehrlich of limited use in interpreting the actual text
of the Montreal Convention.290
The court instead relied on its own textual interpretation of
Article 17 to find that although a passenger may not recover
mental anguish damages absent an “accident” causing bodily in-
jury, there is no requirement that the mental anguish be caused
by the bodily injury itself.291 The court’s interpretation hinged
upon its understanding of the phrase “in case of.” While Etihad
likened the phrase to “caused by,” the court determined that its
meaning was conditional rather than causal.292 In other words, a
passenger need not establish that her emotional damages were
caused by “death or bodily injury.” The passenger need only
show that she suffered emotional damages as a result of an acci-
dent that also happened to cause a bodily injury.293 Accordingly,
the court held that as long as there is an “accident” that causes a
bodily injury, mental anguish damages are recoverable even if
the mental anguish does not flow from the bodily injury itself.294
The court illustrated its interpretation using the diagram in Fig-
ure 1.
DIAGRAM 1
289 Id. at 423 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
290 Id.
291 Id. at 417–18.
292 Id. at 414–15.
293 Id. at 417–18.
294 Id.
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Applying this rationale, the court found that plaintiff had sat-
isfied her burden because she could show the occurrence of an
accident (pricking her finger on a hypodermic needle), which
caused a bodily injury (the pinprick), and she suffered emo-
tional damages as a result of the accident.295
The court’s decision diverges from the conventional under-
standing regarding recovery of emotional damages under the
Montreal Convention. It is unclear, however, how broadly its
holding will be felt. Although the court held that emotional
damages do not have to be tied directly to a bodily injury, it did
hold that there must nevertheless be a bodily injury in order for
a passenger to recover emotional damages. Regardless, Etihad
has filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court,
so it remains to be seen whether the Sixth Circuit’s holding will
have any lasting effect.
V. FAA RULEMAKING
A. FLYERS RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND, INC. V.
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. v. FAA arose from an August
2015 petition by a passengers’ rights group, Flyers Rights Educa-
tion Fund, which asked the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to set forth rules regarding airline seat size and spac-
ing.296 Flyers Rights’ petition stated that while seat pitch and seat
width had steadily decreased over the years, the girth and height
of the average passenger had grown larger.297 Flyers Rights ar-
gued that the decrease in pitch and width could harm passenger
health by causing deep vein thrombosis while also slowing emer-
gency egress.298 Flyers Rights asked the FAA to: (1) limit the de-
gree of seat size changes; (2) place a moratorium on any further
reductions in size, width, pitch, and aisle width until the FAA
could promulgate new rules; and (3) appoint an advisory com-
mittee to advise the FAA regarding new standards.299
The FAA denied the petition, explaining that Flyers Rights
did not raise issues “relate[d] to passenger health and comfort,
and d[id] not raise an immediate safety or security concern.”300
295 Id. at 412.
296 Flyers Rights Educ. Fund, Inc. v. FAA, 864 F.3d 738, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
297 Id. at 741–42.
298 Id. at 742.
299 Id.
300 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
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The FAA stated that emergency egress drills had been successful
with seating configurations more restrictive than those operated
by most airlines, despite the decrease in seat pitch.301 The FAA
similarly dismissed Flyers Rights’ claims about passenger health,
claiming that deep vein thrombosis is a rare condition that can
occur during long periods of seated activity, regardless of seat
size.302 At Flyers Rights’ request, the FAA identified studies it
relied upon in issuing its denial.303 The studies cited by the FAA
did not, however, evaluate the effects of smaller seat size and
increased passenger size on emergency egress procedures.304
Flyers Rights petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit for review, challenging: (1) the FAA’s conclusion that
seat pitch, seat width, and passenger size do not negatively affect
emergency egress; and (2) the FAA’s refusal to consider matters
regarding health and comfort.305 The court noted that its review
of the decision would be quite narrow because a government
agency has broad discretion when it refuses to engage in making
new rules.306 The review would turn on whether there was “some
basis in the record” for the decision and whether the FAA “ade-
quately explained the facts and policy concerns it relied on.”307
Under this standard, the court concluded that the FAA failed
to provide sufficient evidence that decreased seat size and in-
creased passenger size did not affect emergency egress.308 Flyers
Rights’ petition raised a number of valid concerns related to
emergency egress—namely, that more restrictive seating con-
figurations inhibited the ability of passengers to quickly exit
their seats—while the FAA failed to cite any evidence showing
whether smaller seats and larger passengers affect emergency
egress.309 The court also found that the studies cited by the FAA
were several years old and that seat dimensions were larger at
the time.310
The court similarly disregarded the FAA’s explanation that
the results of its emergency egress testing were proprietary and
301 Id.
302 Id. at 742–43.
303 Id. at 743.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 743–44.
306 Id. at 743 (citing WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, 751 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir.
2014)).
307 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
308 Id. at 744.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 745.
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exempt from disclosure.311 Despite the lenient standard of re-
view, the court held the FAA could not “hide the evidentiary
ball” by citing to testing data while simultaneously refusing to
produce it.312 Stated differently, the record could not be com-
pletely devoid of evidence.313
However, the court did side with the FAA regarding the
health and comfort concerns raised by Flyers Rights. The court
found that the FAA’s decision to refrain from creating new
health and safety rules—coupled with its statement that it would
continue to monitor those issues—was “the very type of regula-
tory-effort and resource-allocation judgments that fall squarely
within the agency’s province.”314 The court also credited the
FAA’s response to Flyers Rights’ deep vein thrombosis claim,
where the FAA cited an American College of Physicians study
showing that the risk of developing deep vein thrombosis is not
any higher in economy seats than in business class seats.315 The
court ultimately granted, in part, Flyers Rights’ petition for re-
view and remanded the matter to the FAA with a directive to
provide “a properly reasoned disposition of the petition’s safety
concerns about the adverse impact of decreased seat dimensions
and increased passenger size on aircraft emergency egress.”316
It is unclear whether the FAA will create new rules related to
seat dimensions, but a handful of lawmakers are keen to force
the issue. In mid-2017, a bipartisan group of House and Senate
members introduced the Seat Egress in Air Travel Act of 2017
(SEAT Act).317 The SEAT Act would require the FAA to create
regulations establishing minimum standards for size, width, and
pitch of seats on commercial aircraft.318 In the end, whether the
FAA elects to promulgate new rules may depend on how Con-
gress chooses to proceed.
VI. FEDERAL AND STATE PREEMPTION OF
ZONING REGULATIONS
The proliferation of aircraft, particularly in the Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) category, has created more overlap be-
311 Id. at 747.
312 Id. at 746.
313 Id. at 747.
314 Id. at 749.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 SEAT Act of 2017, H.R. 1467, 115th Cong. (2017).
318 Id. § 2(b)(1).
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tween aviation rules and land use regulations. The decisions be-
low—one state and one federal—underscore the tension that
can arise when a local government attempts to address aviation-
related issues through zoning regulations.
A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
1. Singer v. City of Newton
In Singer v. City of Newton, an FAA-certified drone operator
challenged the City of Newton’s UAS ordinance, which required
owners to register drones with the city and prohibited operation
beyond the operator’s line of sight or in specified areas without
permission.319 Plaintiff challenged the registration requirement
and the operation limits on the basis that the ordinance was pre-
empted by federal law.320 The city countered that the ordinance
was not preempted because the FAA carved out certain areas for
local regulation.321
Plaintiff first argued that the city’s registration requirement
infringed upon “the FAA’s exclusive registration require-
ments.”322 The court agreed, citing an FAA Fact sheet, which
states: “[b]ecause Federal registration is the exclusive means for
registering UAS for purposes of operating an aircraft in naviga-
ble airspace, no state or local government may impose an addi-
tional registration requirement on the operation of UAS in
navigable airspace without first obtaining FAA approval.”323 Ac-
cordingly, the ordinance’s registration provision was
preempted.
Plaintiff next asserted that two subsections in the ordinance
impermissibly restricted flight within the navigable airspace.324
One of the contested subsections prohibited drone operation
over private land below four hundred feet without permission of
the property owner, while the other subsection prohibited
drone operation over public property (regardless of altitude)
without the city’s permission.325 Noting that FAA regulations re-
quire drone operators keep their aircraft below an altitude of
four hundred feet, the court found that these two provisions
319 Singer v. City of Newton, No. CV 17-10071-WGY, 2017 WL 4176477, at *1
(D. Mass. 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-2045 (1st Cir. Oct. 26, 2017).
320 Id. at *2.
321 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
322 Id. at *4.
323 Id. (citation omitted).
324 Id. at *5.
325 Id.
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“work[ed] in tandem [ ] to create an essential ban on drone use
within the limits of Newton.”326 The ordinance’s altitude restric-
tions were thus preempted.
Finally, plaintiff claimed that the city’s requirement that
drones be operated within the visual line of sight of the operator
was preempted by the FAA’s visual observer rule.327 The court
agreed, citing the FAA’s requirement that either the operator or
a visual observer be able to see the aircraft during operation.328
Finding that the ordinance “limits the methods of piloting a
drone beyond that which the FAA has already designated, while
also reaching into navigable [air]space,” the court held that the
visual operation limit was also preempted.329
B. STATE PREEMPTION
1. Roma, III, Ltd. v. Board of Appeals of Rockport
In Roma, III, Ltd. v. Board of Appeals of Rockport, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether a town
needed approval from the aeronautics division of the state De-
partment of Transportation before exercising its zoning author-
ity to restrict land use for a noncommercial private heliport.330
Plaintiff constructed a heliport at a single-family waterfront resi-
dence after the FAA recognized the property as a licensed pri-
vate use heliport.331 The state division of aeronautics also
approved the heliport.332
Approximately a year later, the town building inspector issued
an order stating that use of the heliport violated the town’s zon-
ing bylaw.333 The Board of Appeals of Rockport denied plain-
tiff’s appeal of the order, holding that “[t]he vibration and noise
resounding in this neighborhood[,] even when an over-ocean
approach path would be utilized would, in the judgment of this
[b]oard, be detrimental.”334 Plaintiff thereafter appealed to the
Land Court, which cited a prior appeals court and held that “a
town may not enforce a zoning bylaw that would prohibit a pri-
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id. at *6.
329 Id.





334 Id. at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
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vate landowner from creating a noncommercial private re-
stricted landing area on his or her property, unless the relevant
bylaw had been approved by the division [of aeronautics].”335
The Land Court granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff.336
The Supreme Judicial Court found that nothing in the lan-
guage of the state statute precluded the town from exercising its
zoning authority to regulate the use of land.337 The court deter-
mined that the issue at hand was not the “use and operation of
aircraft,” as that term is used in the Massachusetts aeronautics
statutes.338 Rather, the issue was whether the state intended to
prevent the local exercise of zoning power to regulate the con-
struction and use of private noncommercial heliports.339
Delving into the aeronautics code, the court first observed
that the legislative purpose of the code—fostering air commerce
and private flying within Massachusetts—“does not suggest a leg-
islative intent to encourage the development of private heliports
. . . so that persons may land their helicopters and aircraft on
their own private property.”340 The court also found that land
use regulation had long been “a prerogative of local govern-
ment” and that there was no evidence that the legislature in-
tended to preempt a local government’s ability to protect its
residents from the harms and nuisances associated with non-
commercial private landing areas.341 The court finally held that
if the legislature desired to preempt local zoning authority for
noncommercial private restricted landing areas, “it must pro-
vide a clearer indication of such intent.”342 The court vacated
and remanded the matter to the Land Court for reconsidera-
tion.343 Although neither party raised the issue of federal pre-
emption, the court briefly discussed the issue, noting “[w]ithin
the Federal aviation framework, land use matters are ‘intrinsi-
cally local,’ and the zoning of a heliport ‘remains an issue for
local control.’”344
335 Id. (citing Hanlon v. Sheffield, 50 N.E.3d 443 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016)).
336 Id.
337 Id. at 274.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Id. at 278 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 40).
341 Id.
342 Id. at 278–79.
343 Id. at 276.
344 Id. (citing Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 784 (6th Cir.
1996); Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 415 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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VII. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
A. DRONES AND “NAVIGABLE AIRSPACE”
1. Boggs v. Merideth
In Boggs v. Merideth, plaintiff sued for trespass to chattels
under state law after defendant used a shotgun to shoot down
plaintiff’s drone as it flew over defendant’s property.345 Plaintiff
also sought a declaration from the court that: (1) the drone was
an “aircraft” under federal law; (2) the drone was operating in
federal airspace; (3) the drone was not flying on defendant’s
property; (4) plaintiff did not therefore violate defendant’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy; and (5) a property owner may
not, as a matter of law, shoot at drones operating in federal air-
space.346 Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, arguing that plaintiff’s complaint merely anticipates
certain defenses that the defendant might bring, which is insuffi-
cient to provide federal question jurisdiction.347 Plaintiff’s re-
sponse relied upon the idea that he was operating the drone in
“navigable airspace,” which made resolution of the claims in fed-
eral court appropriate.348
Plaintiff first argued that his Kentucky trespass to chattels
claim was properly before the court under the Grable stan-
dard.349 In Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering
& Manufacturing, the Supreme Court held that state law claims
could implicate federal issues to the extent necessary to create
federal question jurisdiction.350 In such cases, the federal issue
would have to be: “(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed,
(3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by
Congress.”351
The Boggs court was unpersuaded by plaintiff’s hypothetical
Grable argument. The court found that plaintiff’s hypothetical
basis for jurisdiction—“if the unmanned aircraft was flying on
345 Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:16-CV-00006-TBR, 2017 WL 1088093, at *1 (W.D.
Ky. Mar. 21, 2017).
346 Id. at *6.
347 Id. at *1.
348 Id.
349 Id. at *2.
350 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005).
351 See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at
314)).
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[the defendant’s] property, his actions may have been privi-
leged, but if it was flying in federal airspace, they would not”—
did not satisfy the “necessarily raised” requirement under Gra-
ble.352 The court held that a claim of privilege was a defense to a
tort claim under Kentucky law and merely anticipating a defense
is not sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction.353
The court also held that plaintiff’s “garden-variety state tort
claim” was not the type of claim that raised a substantial federal
issue.354 The court noted that no federal agencies (such as the
FAA) were involved in the case, nor were any federal regulations
in dispute.355 Notably, the court flatly rejected the notion that
any questions involving the regulation of drones should be re-
solved exclusively by federal courts.356 Moreover, even if the
state court were to interpret or apply a federal law or regulation,
it would be for “the limited purpose of determining whether
[the plaintiff’s] unmanned aircraft was on [the defendant’s]
property such that [the defendant] could have been privileged
in damaging [the plaintiff’s] chattel.”357 Accordingly, the court
held that it did not have federal question jurisdiction over plain-
tiff’s trespass to chattels claim.
The court also found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
plaintiff’s request for a declaration that drones are “aircraft”
under federal law.358 The court stated that “the purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act is to create a remedy for a preexisting
right enforceable in federal court. It does not provide an inde-
pendent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.”359 Having
concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state
law claim and associated request for declaratory relief, the court
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.
B. FEDERAL STATUTES AND TREATIES
1. Hofmann v. Virgin America, Inc.
In Hofmann v. Virgin America, Inc., a pilot filed suit in Califor-
nia state court against Virgin America, alleging that Virgin had
wrongfully terminated him after he raised concerns about air-
352 Boggs, 2017 WL 1088903, at *3.
353 Id.
354 Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
355 Id. at *5.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 Id. at *6.
359 Id. at *7 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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line safety.360 Specifically, plaintiff alleged claims for: (1)
“wrongful termination in violation of public policy”; (2) “retalia-
tion against an employee for disclosing information to a govern-
ment agency in violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5”;
(3) “breach of contract”; and (4) “tortious breach of [covenant]
of good faith and fair dealing.”361 Virgin removed the case to
federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under
the Act.362 Plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that Virgin “over-
states the scope of preemption and the [Act] does not com-
pletely preempt the state law claims asserted in the
complaint.”363
The court first considered Virgin’s argument that the Act
completely preempted plaintiff’s claims.364 The court noted that
Virgin’s arguments for removal focused solely on its defenses.
This is an insufficient basis for removal because: “[A] case may
not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal de-
fense, including the defense of preemption, even if the defense
is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both par-
ties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at
issue.”365
The court next considered Virgin’s argument that federal
question jurisdiction was proper under Grable.366 The court
found that the question of whether Virgin violated FAA regula-
tions was not a necessary element to plaintiff’s claims.367 Moreo-
ver, plaintiff’s claims did not meet Grable’s “substantial”
requirement because his claims did not depend on a pure issue
of law as they did in Grable.368 As such, plaintiff’s case did not
meet all of the Grable factors, federal jurisdiction was not proper,
and the court granted the motion to remand.369
360 Hofmann v. Virgin Am., Inc., No. 16-CV-05178-BLF, 2017 WL 1373850, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017).
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id. at *2.
364 Id.
365 Id. (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
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2. McCubbins v. United Airlines, Inc.
In McCubbins v. United Airlines, Inc., a passenger sued United
Airlines after it allowed him to board a Panama-bound flight
with a faulty passport.370 Upon arrival in Panama, plaintiff was
detained and told that he could not enter the country because
his passport was due to expire within six months.371 Plaintiff was
detained overnight and placed on a plane back to the United
States.372
Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against United in a Mis-
sissippi state court after suing the wrong entity (United Airlines
Corporation).373 United subsequently removed the matter to
federal court and asked the court to set aside the default judg-
ment because plaintiff sued the wrong entity.374 United con-
tended that federal question jurisdiction was proper because
plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the Montreal Convention
and the ADA.375 The court disagreed and remanded the matter
to state court.376
In the meantime, plaintiff had filed a second lawsuit in state
court to ensure that he had sued the proper entity and to toll
the applicable statute of limitations.377 United again removed to
federal court, arguing for preemption under the Montreal Con-
vention and the ADA.378 In conducting its analysis, the court
noted one significant difference between the first complaint and
the second complaint.
In the second complaint, plaintiff had added language alleg-
ing that United failed to warn plaintiff of restrictions and re-
quirements under “State, Federal, or International treaties.”379
The second complaint also referenced potential defenses that
United might bring and stated that they would violate “Federal
laws . . . and the Constitution of the United States of
America.”380 United argued that this language raised new causes




373 Id. at 559–60.
374 Id. at 560.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 561.
377 Id.
378 Id. at 562.
379 Id. at 563 (emphasis omitted).
380 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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of action under federal law, which presented a federal
question.381
The court disagreed, observing that the crux of these allega-
tions—failure to warn—was grounded in negligence rather than
any federal statute or treaty.382 The court also reiterated that “a
possible federal defense does not give rise to a federal question
for purposes of jurisdiction.”383 Accordingly, the court held that
plaintiff’s complaint, on its face, did not raise a federal
question.384
The court also reconsidered United’s arguments that plain-
tiff’s claims were preempted by the Montreal Convention and
the ADA. Acknowledging that neither the Supreme Court nor
the Fifth Circuit had considered whether common law negli-
gence claims were preempted by the ADA, the court neverthe-
less found that plaintiff’s negligence claims were analogous to a
breach of contract claim, which is not necessarily preempted
under the ADA.385 In any case, the court held that plaintiff’s
claims were not preempted by the ADA.
The court also rejected United’s argument that plaintiff’s
complaint was preempted by Article 19 of the Montreal Conven-
tion. The court held that Article 19, which deals with damages
for “delay in the carriage by air passengers, baggage or cargo,”
had “no application to [the plaintiff’s] grievances as stated in his
complaint.”386 Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims were not pre-
empted by the Montreal Convention, and the court granted
plaintiff’s motion to remand.
C. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
1. Shapiro v. Lundahl
Shapiro v. Lundahl arose out of a private airplane crash in
Mexico.387 Plaintiff was an experienced pilot in his own right but
was flying as a passenger from La Paz, Mexico to Calexico, Cali-
fornia while defendant piloted the aircraft.388 Plaintiff alleged
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Id. (citing New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
384 Id.
385 Id. at 565 (citing Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S.Ct. 1422 (2014)).
386 Id. at 567 (citation omitted).
387 Shapiro v. Lundahl, No. 16-CV-06444-MEJ, 2017 WL 2902799, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. July 7, 2017).
388 Id. at *2.
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that defendant negligently failed to plan a fuel stop during the
trip, forcing the aircraft to divert for fuel at San Felipe Interna-
tional Airport in Mexico.389 Plaintiff further alleged that defen-
dant unexpectedly passed plaintiff the flight controls just prior
to touchdown, leading to a crash that injured all aboard.390
Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence in federal court, arguing
that jurisdiction was proper under admiralty jurisdiction.391
For a tort claim to be proper under admiralty jurisdiction, two
conditions must be met: (1) the tort must occur over navigable
waters (i.e., situs test); and (2) the tortious act must “bear a sig-
nificant relationship to traditional maritime activity” (i.e., nexus
test).392 Plaintiff alleged that the situs test was satisfied because
one of the negligent acts—defendant’s decision not to initially
divert after seeing “white caps” over the Sea of Cortez—oc-
curred over navigable waters.393 The court disagreed, noting
that plaintiff failed to allege “any plausible facts” supporting his
assertion.394 Rather, the unplanned stop and subsequent crash
resulted from a multitude of factors, such as defendant’s failure
to plan a fuel stop before takeoff, defendant’s inability to land
during strong winds, and plaintiff’s inability to save the land-
ing.395 Furthermore, it was undisputed that the crash itself oc-
curred on land, not over navigable waters.396
The court also found that plaintiff failed to satisfy the nexus
test. The court observed that admiralty jurisdiction was only
proper in an aviation case “if, but for aviation, the journey
would have been conducted by sea.”397 Here, Plaintiff failed to
allege that any portion of the trip from La Paz to Calexico would
have been conducted over water if not by plane, nor were there
any other facts suggesting a connection with traditional mari-
time activity.398 Because plaintiff failed to satisfy the nexus and
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VIII. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. GENERALLY
1. Hinkle v. Continental Motors, Inc.
In Hinkle v. Continental Motors, Inc., a pilot and passengers
filed suit in Florida after suffering injuries during a plane crash
in South Carolina.400 Defendants Cirrus Design Corporation
and Cirrus Designs, Inc. (aircraft manufacturer), were based in
Minnesota and defendant Kavlico Corporation, Inc. (manufac-
turer of the allegedly defective sensor), was based in Califor-
nia.401 Defendants claimed they were not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Florida and moved to dismiss.
Plaintiffs argued that defendants submitted to specific juris-
diction in Florida by: (1) engaging in business in Florida; (2)
committing a tort in Florida; (3) causing injury to persons and
property by conducting service activities in Florida; and (4)
breaching a contract required to be performed in Florida.402
The court, however, found no nexus between defendants’ Flor-
ida-related business activities and plaintiffs’ claims.403 Although
the pilot was located in Florida when he purchased the aircraft,
the sale and delivery took place in Minnesota.404
The court similarly concluded that defendants had not con-
ducted a tortious act within Florida. Plaintiffs failed to cite any
communications into Florida by defendants that constituted a
tortious act.405 Additionally, the aircraft was manufactured, sold,
and delivered in Minnesota, not in Florida.406
For the breach of contract claim, the court found no exis-
tence of a contract between Kavlico and any plaintiff.407 As to
Cirrus, the court noted that the contract required delivery in
Minnesota and that the alleged breach occurs “at the point of
delivery of the nonconforming goods.”408 Cirrus would there-
400 Hinkle v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1317–18 (M.D. Fla.
2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-13716-J, 2017 WL 5635149 (11th Cir. Oct. 17,
2017).
401 Id. at 1317.
402 Id. at 1322.
403 Id. at 1323.
404 Id. at 1323–25.
405 Id. at 1324.
406 Id.
407 Id. at 1325.
408 Id. (quoting Advanced Bodycare Sols. LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 514 F.
Supp. 2d 1326, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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fore be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Minnesota for
the breach of contract claim, but not in Florida.409
Finally, the court found, under Florida’s long arm statute,
that the place of injury must be within Florida rather than an-
other state such as South Carolina.410 Although plaintiffs argued
that the injuries occurred in Florida because some of them re-
sided there, the court remained unpersuaded, finding South
Carolina to be the actual “place of injury.”411
Plaintiffs also argued that defendants were subject to general
jurisdiction in Florida. Plaintiffs argued that Cirrus engaged in
“intrastate and interstate” business activities by shipping planes
to Florida, providing service in Florida, marketing in Florida,
and training pilots in Florida.412 Plaintiffs argued that Kavlico
had similarly submitted to general jurisdiction in Florida be-
cause its activities within the state were “substantial and not
isolated.”413
Citing Daimler, the court concluded that defendants were not
subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because neither of
them conducted enough activity within Florida to be considered
“essentially at home” in the forum.414 With none of the defend-
ants being incorporated in Florida or having their principal
place of business in Florida, general jurisdiction was not proper
and the court granted the motion to dismiss.415
2. Sia v. AirAsia Berhad
In Sia v. AirAsia Berhad, survivors of passengers killed on AirA-
sia Flight 8501 sued the airline and a parts manufacturer in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.416
Flight 8501 crashed while carrying passengers—none of whom
were U.S. citizens—from Indonesia to Singapore.417 Plaintiffs
claimed that Artus S.A.S., a French legal entity with its principal
place of business in France, was partially liable for the crash be-
409 Id.
410 See id. at 1325–26 (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a)(6)).
411 Id.
412 Id. at 1326–27.
413 Id. at 1327.
414 Id.
415 Id. at 1327–28.
416 Sia v. AirAsia Berhad, No. C16-1692 TSZ, 2017 WL 1408172, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 20, 2017).
417 Id.
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cause it manufactured a defective rudder travel limiter unit.418
Plaintiffs also sued AirAsia Berhad, a Malaysian legal entity with
its principal place of business in Malaysia, because it partially
owned the operator of Flight 8501.419 Both defendants moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The court determined that neither defendant was subject to
general jurisdiction in the United States because neither defen-
dant had contacts “so continuous and systematic” as to be at
home in the United States.420 The court also found that neither
defendant was subject to specific jurisdiction in the United
States.421
With respect to Artus, the court held that plaintiffs’ claims did
not arise out of any forum-related activity by Artus.422 The de-
sign, manufacture, and sale of the part at issue all occurred in
France rather than the United States.423 Furthermore, Plaintiffs
could not cite a single forum-related contact by Artus, such as
delivery of products to the United States.424
As to AirAsia Berhad, plaintiffs claimed that jurisdiction was
proper in the United States because AirAsia Berhad: (1) had its
website on a Seattle-based server; (2) was involved in a joint ven-
ture with Expedia, Inc. in Washington; and (3) had engaged in
commercial transactions with Washington-based companies.425
The court disagreed, finding “no nexus between any of these
activities and an alleged breach of AirAsia Berhad’s duty to
maintain, repair, and supervise [the] operation of an aircraft in-
volved in a [c]rash occurring halfway around the world.”426
The court held that neither defendant was subject to personal
jurisdiction in the United States and granted dismissal.
B. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
1. Helicopter Transport Services, LLC v. Sikorsky Aircraft
Corp.
In Helicopter Transport Services, LLC v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., two
respective owners of Sikorsky S-61R model helicopters sued Si-
418 Id.
419 Id. at *2.
420 Id. at *3.
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korsky after the FAA grounded the helicopters until a certain
model gear box could be installed.427 Plaintiffs claimed that the
model gear box required by the FAA no longer existed and that
no technical specifications were available to allow anyone to
manufacture the part, keeping the helicopters grounded “indef-
initely.”428 Plaintiffs filed suit in Oregon and Sikorsky moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Sikorsky first argued that the acts of its wholly-owned subsidi-
ary—Sikorsky Commercial Services, Inc. (SCS)—could not be
imputed to Sikorsky for purposes of establishing personal juris-
diction in Oregon.429 Sikorsky relied upon the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Daimler AG v. Bauman and Walden v. Fiore in support
of its argument.430 Specifically, Sikorsky asserted that Daimler ex-
pressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s agency theory, which would
“subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever
they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate.”431
The court, however, rejected Sikorsky’s argument, reasoning
that the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s agency the-
ory only as it relates to general jurisdiction.432 In fact, the Su-
preme Court expressly acknowledged that “a corporation can
purposefully avail itself of a forum by directing its agents or dis-
tributors to take action there.”433 Having determined that SCS’s
actions could be considered a part of its analysis, the court ex-
amined whether Sikorsky had “purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of doing business in [Oregon].”434
The court found that SCS maintained a “comprehensive in-
ventory” of Sikorsky parts and was the sole reliable source for
such products.435 The court also found that SCS provided key
logistical and repair support, which involved multiple communi-
cations between SCS and plaintiffs.436 The court found these
post-sale contacts to be particularly relevant because “the real
427 Helicopter Transp. Servs., LLC v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 253 F. Supp. 3d
1115, 1120 (D. Or. 2017).
428 Id. at 1123.
429 Id. at 1125.
430 Id. at 1125–26.
431 Id. at 1125 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 (2014)).
432 Id. at 1126.
433 Id. (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 135 n.13) (emphasis omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
434 Id. at 1127 (quoting Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir.
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
435 Id. at 1128.
436 Id.
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object of the business transaction becomes the sale of replace-
ment parts and related services and technical advice.”437 The
court concluded that these post-sale contacts by Sikorsky and
SCS reflected the “type of affirmative conduct” that reflected an
intent by Sikorsky to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of
doing business in Oregon.438
The court then considered whether plaintiffs’ claims arose
out of Sikorsky’s and SCS’s contacts with Oregon. The court
found that Sikorsky’s field service representative in Oregon had
instructed plaintiffs to install a certain model gear box on the
helicopters.439 The installation of this particular model gear
box—later determined to be insufficient by the FAA—was the
origin of plaintiffs’ claims.440 The court determined this “affirm-
ative conduct” to be sufficient to show that the claims arose
from Sikorsky’s contacts with Oregon and therefore concluded
that plaintiffs showed enough jurisdictional facts to allege that
Sikorsky was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in
Oregon.441
It is worth reiterating that the key to the entire analysis was
SCS’s contacts with the forum. “Indeed, but for the actions of
SCS, the conduct of Sikorsky by itself would be insufficient to
establish specific personal jurisdiction.”442 But as shown below,
the contacts of a wholly owned subsidiary do not necessarily sub-
ject a parent corporation to personal jurisdiction.
2. Everett v. Leading Edge Air Foils, LLC
In Everett v. Leading Edge Air Foils, LLC, a pilot sued four de-
fendants after the engine on his airplane stalled, causing the
plane to crash.443 Plaintiff purchased the engine at the EAA
AirVenture Oshkosh airshow in Oshkosh, Wisconsin.444 Three of
the defendants were dismissed due to lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, and the plaintiff settled his claims against the remaining
437 Id. at 1129.
438 Id. at 1127, 1130.
439 Id. at 1131–32.
440 Id. at 1132.
441 Id.
442 Id. at 1128.
443 Everett v. Leading Edge Air Foils, LLC, No. 14-C-1189, 2017 WL 2894135, at
*2 (E.D. Wis. July 7, 2017).
444 Id.
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defendant.445 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration after
the matter was assigned to another judge.446
The settling defendant (LEAF) is a Wisconsin LLC that sold
the engine to plaintiff at the airshow.447 The engine was manu-
factured by defendant BRP-Rotax and sold to LEAF through
BRP-Rotax’s independent distributor, defendant Kodiak.448
BRP-Rotax is an Austrian legal entity with its principal place of
business in Austria, while Kodiak is a Bahamas legal entity based
solely in the Bahamas.449 The court began its analysis by noting
that in products liability cases, a distributor and manufacturer
are subject to specific jurisdiction in the place of sale to the
plaintiff if the sale “arose from the efforts of the manufacturer
or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its
product in that state.”450
The court found that BRP-Rotax and Kodiak were both aware
that LEAF sold Rotax branded products in Wisconsin and that
both foreign companies listed LEAF on their respective website
as a dealer and service provider for Wisconsin.451 The court also
observed that LEAF was one of only three authorized Rotax
dealers in the country, which allowed LEAF to market products
using the Rotax brand.452 These facts demonstrated BRP-Rotax’s
and Kodiak’s intent to serve the Wisconsin market by introduc-
ing Rotax products “into the stream of commerce with the ex-
pectation that they would be sold by LEAF in Wisconsin.”453 The
court held that BRP-Rotax and Kodiak were indeed subject to
personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin and reinstated both defend-
ants as parties.454
But the court declined to reinstate BRP-Rotax’s Canadian par-
ent company, BRP Inc., as a party to the lawsuit.455 Although the
record reflected that BRP Inc. was not part of the manufacture,
design, or distribution of aircraft engines, plaintiff argued that
BRP Inc. was nevertheless subject to personal jurisdiction in Wis-
445 Id. at *1.
446 Id.
447 Id. at *1–2.
448 Id.
449 Id.
450 Id. at *4 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)).
451 Id. at *2.
452 Id. at *4.
453 Id.
454 Id. at *5.
455 Id.
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consin through its subsidiary, BRP-Rotax.456 The court found
that the contacts of a subsidiary are generally “not imputed to
the parent” unless the parent maintains an “unusual degree of
control over the subsidiary.”457 Here, the court held that plain-
tiff failed to show anything more than a parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship, which in and of itself, was insufficient to impute BRP-
Rotax’s jurisdictional contacts to BRP Inc.458 Accordingly, BRP
Inc. was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin.
C. VENUE BEFORE JURISDICTION
Courts typically review and decide jurisdictional challenges
before venue challenges. But courts may consider the venue is-
sue first if “there is a sound prudential justification for doing
so.”459 A court may, for instance, reverse the order if the jurisdic-
tional issue is particularly complicated.460 A court may also de-
cide the venue issue first when, as in the case below, it is clear
that venue is improper.
1. Ricks v. Cadorath Aerospace Lafayette, LLC
In Ricks v. Cadorath Aerospace Lafayette, LLC, plaintiff filed suit
in the Eastern District of Louisiana after her husband was killed
while piloting a helicopter in Mississippi.461 Defendant Rolls-
Royce moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and im-
proper venue and, alternatively, moved to transfer the case to
the Southern District of Indiana.462
The court noted that the parties had “vigorously dispute[d]
whether Rolls-Royce’s contacts with Louisiana [were] sufficient
to establish that exercising personal jurisdiction over Rolls-
Royce in the state of Louisiana is constitutional.”463 In contrast,
plaintiff had not shown that venue would be proper in the East-
ern District of Louisiana and could not point to a single contact
by Rolls-Royce in the district.464 Plaintiff did not allege that any
456 Id.
457 Id. (citations omitted).
458 Id.
459 Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
460 See, e.g., Hypower, Inc. v. Atl. Elec., LLC, No. 12-61633-Civ-SCOLA, 2013
WL 12086268, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2013).
461 Ricks v. Cadorath Aerospace Lafayette, LLC, No. CV 15-6686 c/w 16-2593,
2017 WL 590293, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2017).
462 Id. at *1–2.
463 Id. at *6.
464 Id.
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of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the district, nor
did plaintiff allege that any property subject to the action was
located in the district.465 Venue was, however, proper in the
Southern District of Indiana where Rolls-Royce maintains its
principal place of business.466
Because venue was “clearly improper” in the Eastern District
of Louisiana, the court held that it was unnecessary to resolve
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and instead
transferred the matter to the Southern District of Indiana.467
IX. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
A. KOLAWOLE V. SELLERS
In Kolawole v. Sellers, the Eleventh Circuit considered an ap-
peal from an order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under the forum
non conveniens doctrine.468 Plaintiffs sued in federal court in
Florida after an airliner crashed in Nigeria, killing all aboard
and several individuals on the ground.469 The district court
maintained the claims filed on behalf of U.S. citizens and re-
sidents but dismissed claims brought on behalf of foreign plain-
tiffs.470 On appeal, the court observed that for defendant to
prevail on a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non con-
veniens, she had to: (1) demonstrate the availability of an ade-
quate alternative forum; and (2) show that the private and
public interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal.471
In support of her motion, defendant submitted an affidavit
provided by a Nigerian professor, who concluded that the Niger-
ian judiciary could offer appropriate legal remedies for wrong-
ful death similar to remedies available in the United States.472
Plaintiffs countered that Nigeria was too dangerous and corrupt
and that the case could take thirty years to litigate.473 Plaintiffs
submitted State Department travel advisories and affidavits from
two former Nigerian justices in support of their position.474 De-
465 Id. at *9.
466 Id. at *10.
467 Id. at *6, *11.
468 Kolawole v. Sellers, 863 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2017).
469 Id.
470 Id. at 1366.
471 Id. at 1369.
472 Id. at 1370.
473 Id.
474 Id. at 1370.
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fendant’s expert countered that recent reforms to the Nigerian
justice system rendered many of these concerns moot.475
The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Nigeria would be an adequate alterna-
tive forum.476 Plaintiffs did not “identify any specific dangers re-
lated to this particular litigation . . . or evidence of partiality”
related to their claims.477 The court similarly disregarded Plain-
tiffs’ argument that the district court was required to hold a
hearing on the matter or accept their experts’ testimony as true,
finding no such requirement in the law.478 Having determined
that an alternate forum was available and adequate, the court
next considered the private and public factors.479
The court found that the district court properly considered a
host of private factors, including the fact that most of the evi-
dence was located in Nigeria and that a U.S. court “would be
unable to compel the cooperation of non-party Nigerian wit-
nesses.”480 The court also found that the presumption in favor of
plaintiffs’ chosen forum was weakened because “none of the
[p]laintiffs or their decedents whose cases were dismissed were
United States citizens or residents.”481
As to the public factors, the court found that the district court
properly considered the public factors and “reasonably con-
cluded” that: (1) plaintiffs’ case would cause significant delays in
the district court’s docket; (2) the case would be a burden upon
jurors in South Florida; (3) the court might have to apply Niger-
ian law; and (4) Nigeria had a compelling interest in resolving
the claims.482 Accordingly, dismissal was proper.
B. ROSEN V. EXECUJET SERVICES LLC
In Rosen v. Execujet Services LLC, the representative of an air-
craft mechanic’s estate filed a wrongful death action in Florida
after the mechanic was killed while servicing a landing gear in
the Bahamas.483 Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of fo-
rum non conveniens.
475 Id. at 1370–71.
476 Id. at 1371.
477 Id. (citations omitted).
478 Id.
479 Id.
480 Id. at 1372.
481 Id.
482 Id.
483 Rosen v. Execujet Servs., LLC, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
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The court found the Supreme Court of the Bahamas to be an
adequate alternative forum. Defendants cited Bahamian case
law showing that the Bahamas recognizes negligence actions like
those asserted by plaintiff.484 While plaintiff argued that the ap-
plicable statute of limitations in the Bahamas had already ex-
pired, defendants agreed to waive any such defenses.485 The
court found that these stipulations and facts were sufficient to
make the Bahamian court an adequate alternative forum.486
The court also found that the private interest factors weighed
in favor of defendants’ motion. Defendants pointed to over a
dozen witnesses who were located in the Bahamas, including the
only eyewitness and members of the police department who in-
vestigated the incident.487 Although other relevant witnesses
were located in the United States, the court found that the most
critical witnesses were located in the Bahamas and that the Ba-
hamian witnesses would not be subject to compulsory process if
the case were to remain in the United States.488
Finally, the court held that the public factors weighed in favor
of dismissal. The court agreed with defendants that Florida re-
sidents would have little interest in a suit brought on behalf of
decedent’s Connecticut widow, against non-Florida defendants,
for an incident in the Bahamas.489 The court also agreed that
the Bahamas had a greater interest in the lawsuit than the
United States because the matter involved “proper aircraft main-
tenance and services undertaken by foreign entities and individ-
uals at the Bahamas airport.”490 While the court did
acknowledge that the United States had an interest in providing
its own citizens with a forum for their grievances, the court held
that the aircraft safety issue was more significant for the Baha-
mas.491 Given the weight of all factors, the court granted defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss.
484 Id. at 1308.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 1309.
487 Id. at 1309–11.
488 Id. at 1312.
489 Id. at 1315.
490 Id. at 1316.
491 Id. at 1316–17.
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C. OTO V. AIRLINE TRAINING CENTER ARIZONA, INC.
Oto v. Airline Training Center Arizona, Inc. arose from the delib-
erate crash of Germanwings Flight 9525.492 Plaintiffs sued in fed-
eral court in Arizona, claiming that defendant had “breached its
duty of care to the passengers of the [flight] by failing to prop-
erly screen and monitor [the co-pilot] for mental health condi-
tions” during his flight training.493 Defendant filed a number of
motions, including a motion to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens.494
The court first acknowledged that Germany was an adequate
alternative forum. The court noted that defendant had agreed
to submit to the jurisdiction of the German judiciary and that
plaintiffs did not contest the adequacy of German courts.495
The court then found that the private and public interest fac-
tors weighed in favor of dismissal. The court observed that the
vast majority of the decedents were German citizens and that the
plaintiffs and witnesses were also located primarily in Ger-
many.496 Additionally, Arizona’s interest in the litigation was
“comparatively low” compared to Germany’s interest, and the
Arizona court would be less adept at interpreting and applying
German law.497 Moreover, the cost to German courts would be
considerably lower because most of the evidence was located in
Germany.498 As such, the court granted defendant’s motion to
dismiss for forum non conveniens.
X. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. ANDREINI V. UNITED STATES
In Andreini v. United States, the survivors of a stunt pilot sued
the government through the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA),
asserting negligence under California law for failure to comply
with federal safety policies after the pilot was killed during an air
show at the Travis Air Force Base.499 The pilot died when
492 Oto Airline Training Ctr. Ariz., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1102 (D. Ariz.
2017).
493 Id. at 1103.
494 Id. at 1107.
495 Id. at 1108.
496 Id. at 1108–09.
497 Id. at 1109.
498 Id.
499 Andreini v. United States, No. 3:15-cv-01169-JD, 2017 WL 3895705, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2017).
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firefighters failed to save him from the post-crash fire.500 The
government invoked the FTCA’s discretionary function excep-
tion to challenge jurisdiction and moved to dismiss.501
The discretionary function exception excludes jurisdiction for
“[a]ny claim based upon . . . a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”502 In deter-
mining whether the discretionary function applies, courts ask
“whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting em-
ployee.”503 Plaintiffs’ allegations must explain the specific con-
duct that must be reviewed to determine if discretionary
immunity applies.504
Plaintiffs’ allegations hinged upon the theory that rescue vehi-
cles arrived too late to save the pilot because firefighters were on
the other side of the airfield taking photographs, which pre-
vented a quick response.505 Plaintiffs further averred that the
government was liable because there was not a public address
system at the fire station that would have allowed the firefighters
to be quickly summoned.506 The government responded that
the target time for response was five minutes, which was satisfied
when the first truck responded in four minutes and thirty
seconds.507
The court ruled that plaintiffs’ allegations did not implicate
any social, economic, or policy judgment by the government.508
Rather, the question implicated by plaintiffs’ allegations was
“how the government is alleged to have been negligent.”509 Be-
cause the alleged negligence centered on the firefighters’ deci-
sion to cross the airfield to take photos—an activity that did not
touch upon any policy judgment by the government—the dis-
cretionary function exception did not apply.510 Furthermore,
plaintiffs alleged that the government did not meet well-estab-
500 Id.
501 Id.
502 Id. at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)) (alteration in original).




507 Id. at *3.
508 Id.
509 Id. (citing Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1185 (9th Cir. 2005))
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
510 Id.
2018] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 251
lished aviation crash response times of three minutes.511 Accord-
ingly, the government’s motion was denied in its entirety.512
B. MORALES V. UNITED STATES
In Morales v. United States, plaintiffs sued the government after
their father was killed while flying a helicopter over the Prescott
National Forest in Arizona.513 The helicopter crashed after the
decedent pilot struck a cable that was strung across a canyon by
the U.S. Geological Survey.514 Although the cable had been in
place since 1934, it did not appear on aeronautical charts.515 At
the end of the first phase of discovery, the government moved to
dismiss and plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judg-
ment.516 The government argued, in relevant part, that plain-
tiffs’ claims were barred by sovereign immunity.517
The court applied the Supreme Court’s two-part test to deter-
mine whether the Geological Survey’s decision not to mark the
cable was a discretionary function.518 The first part of the test
asks whether the governmental action (or inaction) “is a matter
of choice for the acting employee and . . . discretionary because
it involves an element of judgment.”519 An action cannot, how-
ever, be considered discretionary if a regulation or policy re-
quires a specific course of action.520 Under the second part of
the test, a court asks whether the decision is the type of judg-
ment that the discretionary exception was intended to pro-
tect.521 To meet this burden, the government need only show
that the decision is “the type grounded in social, economic, or
political policy judgments.”522
The government asserted that the Geological Survey’s deci-
sion not to mark the cable was a discretionary act because: (1)
“no statute, regulation, or policy specifically directed the [Geo-
511 Id.
512 Id.
513 Morales v. United States, No. CV-14-08110-PCT-JJT, 2017 WL 67546, at *1





518 Id. at *6 (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
519 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
520 Id.
521 Id.
522 Id. (quoting Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018,
1028 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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logical Survey] to mark the cable”; and (2) the decision was “sus-
ceptible to policy analysis and therefore the type of decision that
the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”523
Plaintiffs argued that the decision did not involve public policy,
but instead involved a safety decision that arose from an unsafe
condition created by the Geological Survey.524 Plaintiffs further
argued that the government had failed to show that the decision
not to mark such cables was “susceptible to any valid policy
consideration.”525
With respect to the first element, the court concluded that the
Geological Survey’s decision not to mark the cable weighed in
favor of immunity. The court found that there was no statute,
policy, or regulation at the time of the accident (2012) that re-
quired the Geological Survey to mark the cable.526 The court
further noted that the Geological Survey considers several fac-
tors when deciding to mark a cable, such as economic consider-
ations, the safety of its employees, the priorities of the agency
that manages the land (in this case, the U.S. Forest Service), and
aircraft safety.527 The fact that the Geological Survey considers
different factors when making its decision evidenced that the
decision required judgment (i.e., discretion).528
The court also found that the Geological Survey’s deference
to FAA regulations regarding air space obstructions when decid-
ing whether to mark the cable was “rooted in public policy.”529
This deference was precisely “the type of agency decision that
Congress sought to protect from judicial review.”530 Because the
Geological Survey’s decision not to mark the cable was subject to
the discretionary function exception under the FTCA, the court
held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims.531
C. CURTIS V. UNITED STATES
In Curtis v. United States, one of two plaintiffs sued the govern-
ment after her husband was killed when his aircraft crashed
523 Id.
524 Id.
525 Id. (citation omitted).
526 Id.
527 Id. at *7.
528 Id.
529 Id.
530 Id. (citing United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 798 (1984)).
531 Id. at *8.
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while attempting to avoid a runway collision with another air-
craft and glider at an uncontrolled airport.532 The aircraft and
glider were operated by members of the Civil Air Patrol, an Air
Force auxiliary organization.533 Under local rules at the airport,
glider operators were required to: (1) file a Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) advising other pilots of glider activity; (2) use a spot-
ter with an unobstructed view of the ends of each runway; and
(3) refrain from launching from one of the runways if a pow-
ered aircraft is within five miles on approach to the intersecting
runway.534 Because the airport was uncontrolled, pilots were ob-
ligated to communicate with one another using the airport’s
common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF).
Based on the testimony of witnesses, the court determined
that the Civil Air Patrol aircraft was traveling toward the inter-
section of the runways as the decedent’s aircraft was about to
touch down near the same intersection.535 Just prior to touch-
down, the pilot of the decedent’s aircraft—in an apparent at-
tempt to avoid a collision—applied full power to the engines.536
The rapid application of power caused the aircraft to pitch up,
stall, roll to the left, and crash.537 Based on these facts, the court
concluded after a bench trial that the presence of the Civil Air
Patrol aircraft near the runway intersection caused the fatal
crash.538
At trial, the government admitted that the Civil Air Patrol had
failed to follow local rules requiring the filing of a NOTAM and
use of a spotter.539 But the government contested the notion
that the local rules applied to Civil Air Patrol flights.540 The
court found, irrespective of whether the local rules applied, that
the failure to use a spotter constituted a breach of its duty to
conduct safe flight operations.541 The court also found that the
failure to yield the right-of-way as required under FAA regula-
tions similarly breached the duty to conduct safe flight opera-
tions.542 Finally, the court held that the Civil Air Patrol failed to
532 Curtis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1369–75 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
533 Id. at 1369.
534 Id. at 1371.
535 Id. at 1375.
536 Id. at 1372.
537 Id. at 1375.




542 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(g)).
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act with reasonable care by failing to announce its actions over
CTAF.543
Applying Georgia negligence law, the court ruled that the
Civil Air Patrol’s actions constituted a breach of its duty to act
with reasonable care, which caused the crash.544 The govern-
ment was therefore liable under the FTCA.
XI. CONFLICTS OF LAW
A. O’BRIEN V. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO.
In O’Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co., the plaintiff sued a number of
defendants after the Cessna 208B Caravan he was piloting
crashed through the roof of a building and into a utility pole
while approaching the airport at Alliance, Nebraska.545 The jury
found in favor of defendants and plaintiff appealed.546 One of
the issues plaintiff appealed was the trial court’s conclusion that
Nebraska law, rather than Kansas law, applied to the issue of
punitive damages.547
Nebraska law does not permit recovery of punitive dam-
ages.548 Kansas, however, does permit punitive damages in cases
involving “malicious, vindictive, or willful and wanton invasion
of another’s rights, with the ultimate purpose being to restrain
and deter others from the commission of similar wrongs.”549 Ac-
cordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that there
was a conflict between Nebraska law and Kansas law regarding
punitive damages.550
The court applied § 146 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws, which states that “[i]n an action for a personal in-
jury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless . . .
some other state has a more significant relationship . . . .”551 The
most significant relationship test examines the following con-
tacts: (1) the place of injury; (2) the place of the injury-causing
543 Id.
544 Id.
545 O’Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 903 N.W.2d 432, 444 (Neb. 2017).
546 Id.
547 Id. at 458.
548 Id. (citing Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574
(Neb. 1989)).
549 Id. (quoting Adamson v. Bicknell, 287 P.3d 274, 280 (Kan. 2012)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
550 Id. at 459.
551 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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conduct; (3) the place where the parties reside or conduct busi-
ness; and (4) the place where the relationship between the par-
ties is centered.552
The district court found that Nebraska had a greater interest
in applying its law because plaintiff lived in Nebraska, was in-
jured in Nebraska, was flying a regular route within Nebraska,
was employed in Nebraska, and the alleged product failure oc-
curred in Nebraska.553 The court noted that plaintiff failed to
cite any errors in the record, but instead simply argued that
Kansas’s punitive damages law should apply because defendant
Cessna was based in Kansas.554 Plaintiff also failed to argue that
Kansas law should apply to any area in the case other than puni-
tive damages.555 Consequently, the trial court did not err in find-
ing that Nebraska law applied to the punitive damages issue.
XII. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
A. BURNETTE V. SIERRA NEVADA CORP.
In Burnette v. Sierra Nevada Corp., plaintiff sued after her son
was killed in an airplane crash near the Panama-Colombia bor-
der.556 Plaintiff’s son was a sensor operator aboard a counter-
narcotics surveillance aircraft in Latin America.557 On the night
of his death, decedent’s aircraft was conducting a surveillance
mission but had been given strict instructions to stay over the
Caribbean Sea at all times because the ground proximity warn-
ing system had been disabled.558 The crew nevertheless crossed
over land and struck a ridge, killing plaintiff’s son and three
others.559
Defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, as-
serting that plaintiff should be limited to pecuniary losses under
the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).560 Defendant argued
that although the crash itself occurred in Colombia, the negli-
gent act leading to the accident—decedent’s failure to tell the
552 Id. (citation omitted).
553 Id. at 460.
554 Id.
555 Id.
556 Burnette v. Sierra Nev. Corp., No. 2:14-cv-2761 JWS, 2017 WL 264465, at
*1–2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2017).
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pilots to turn back to sea—occurred over the water.561 Defen-
dant implored the court to “pinpoint the location where the
wrongful or negligent act consummates or initially takes effect
and not the place where any previous or subsequent negligence
occurred.”562 Under defendant’s theory, decedent’s failure to in-
struct the pilots to turn away from the coastline was the moment
when the negligence occurred, and because it occurred over
water, DOHSA applies.563
The court rejected defendant’s theory, finding that “[t]he
consummation of the negligent acts is the crash itself . . . .”564
Regardless of whether negligent acts occurred on the high seas
that may have ultimately led to the crash, the crash itself oc-
curred on land, rendering DOHSA inapplicable.565 The court
also disagreed that decedent’s alleged failure to warn the pilots
was the proximate cause of the crash, noting that there were
factual disputes as to who was responsible for maintaining sepa-
ration from the coastline.566 As such, the court denied defen-
dant’s motion.
561 Id.
562 Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
563 Id.
564 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
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